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The construction industry has one of the worst occupational health and safety 
records of all industries. In spite of stringent regulations and much attention towards 
reducing risks in the physical environment, the construction industry continues to be 
associated with high levels of accidents, injuries, and illnesses. Construction safety 
management activities are typically categorized into safety planning and execution 
processes. Despite the interdependent relationship between safety planning and execution 
processes, current safety planning processes lack a systematic approach because of 
limited safety tools and site-specific information available. As a result, safety planning 
and execution processes are generally segregated and, consequently, most safety 
execution processes rely on ad-hoc safety activities during construction.  
The objective of this research is to systematically formalize the construction 
safety planning process in a 4-dimensional (4D) environment to address site-specific 
temporal and spatial safety information, by leveraging project schedules and information 
technology to improve current construction safety management practices. Prior to 
developing a specific framework, this research presents a safety risk generation and 
control model to describe the phenomenon of dynamic safety risk, incorporating 
construction domain knowledge. The proposed model addresses how the inherent risk of 
 vi 
a worker can be transformed by different measurable contexts of activities. Based on the 
theoretical model, this research assessed safety risk of different construction trades in a 
quantitative manner. By integrating multiple national injury databases, safety risks of 
different construction occupations were analyzed to explain common risk types, sources 
of injury, and risk scenarios associated with each occupation type. With results of safety 
risk analysis as a reference, a formalized safety planning framework to aid in developing 
a long-term safety risk prediction plan was proposed. The proposed framework analyzed 
activity, work period, and work zone safety by integrating a project schedule and a 3D 
model. The proposed safety planning process was tested in a real-world project. 
This research advances safety knowledge, integrating site-specific temporal and 
spatial information, and significantly affecting the construction safety planning process. 
The proposed safety planning approach can provide safety personnel with a site-specific 
proactive safety planning tool that can be used to better manage jobsite safety by 
predicting activity risk, work period risk, and work zone risk in advance. In addition, 
visual safety materials can also aid in training workers on safety and, consequently, being 
able to identify site-specific hazards and respond to them effectively. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
The construction industry has one of the worst occupational health and safety 
records of all industries. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, in 2013, 828 
construction workers were killed, which represents 18.1% of fatal work injuries in the 
United States (BLS 2013). 828 fatalities indicate that the fatal work injury rate is 9.7 for 
every 100,000 full-time equivalent construction workers, and United States (US) 
construction workers are approximately 2.94 times more likely to be killed compared to 
the average fatal work injury rate for all industries, which is 3.3.  
Figure 1 shows the annual fatality and disabling rate for construction industry 
between 1952 and 2004. 
 
 
Figure 1: Annual fatality and disabling rate for construction industry between 1952 and 
2004 (Esmaeili and Hallowell 2011) 
As shown in Figure 1, since the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was 
established, which places the responsibility of construction safety on the employer, 
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fatality and disabling rate in the construction industry has dramatically decreased. After 
this federal law came into effect, various injury prevention strategies have been 
developed and resulted in a significant improvement of safety management in the 
construction industry (Esmaeili and Hallowell 2011). However, during the last decade, 
construction safety improvement has decelerated and fatality rate in the construction 
industry is still much higher than other industries (BLS 2013). Therefore, innovative 
injury prevention practices need to be developed to improve current construction safety 
management practices.  
This chapter introduces the importance of safety planning, summarizes current 
process and challenges of safety management practices, provides the research vision and 
research questions, and describes the organization and structure of this dissertation. 
1.1 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
In spite of stringent regulations and much attention towards reducing risks in the 
physical environment, the construction industry continues to be associated with high 
levels of accidents, injuries and illnesses. The high level of risk in the construction 
industry has been explained by inherent characteristics of the construction industry. One 
of unique characteristics is the dynamic nature of the construction work environment. 
Unlike what happens in other industries having static and indoor work environment, 
construction sites are very dynamic in terms of ground conditions, temporal structures, 
weather conditions, and equipment (Fredericks et al. 2005). The coexistence of work 
teams with different tasks working in a common area increases the complexity of safety 
risk profiles. Also, the work teams are in constant rotation throughout the project and 
their members may also change along the way (Carter and Smith 2006; Hinze 1997; 
Hinze and Wilson 2000; Yi and Langford 2006). 
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The most effective way for improving safety performance is to prevent accidents 
before they occur. In this manner, proactive safety management is important. Typical 
safety planning process includes the following three-steps: hazard identification, risk 
assessment, and safety control (Tixier et al. 2002). Hallowell and Gambatese (2009) 
stated typical construction safety practices focus more on hazard identification and risk 
assessment are typically performed through subjective safety experts’ judgement. Due to 
the lack of tools, frequent and thorough risk analyses at construction sites are hardly ever 
performed. (Tang et al. 1997). Moreover, hazard identification levels are often far from 
ideal (Carter and Smith 2006). Also, Rozenfeld et al. (2009) pointed out that risk levels in 
construction settings fluctuate with dynamic work environment and, thus, uniform levels 
of investment in proactive safety measures can be illusive and inefficient. 
 Despite the interdependent relationship between safety planning and execution 
processes, current safety planning practice lack a systematic approach to effectively 
identify and manage hazards prior to construction that reflect the dynamic nature of 
construction. Current safety planning activities lack site-specific information and, when 
general safety plans are used as safety materials, safety meetings/trainings are less 
effective and result in workers not being able to identify site-specific hazards and respond 
to them effectively. Due to ineffective safety planning process, safety planning and 
execution processes are generally segregated and, consequently, most safety execution 
processes rely on ad-hoc safety activities during construction. Given that the majority of 
hazards are generated from specific site conditions and activities in construction work 
zones, developing site-specific safety plans is fundamental in order to improve the safety 




1.2 MOTIVATING CASE 
In order to better understand the current state of practice in construction safety 
management and further understand the problems related to current safety planning, a 
case study was conducted on a construction project as a motivating case for this research. 
The motivating case is a four story parking garage project that is currently under 
construction in Austin, Texas, and the gross square footage is 1,637,000. The general 
contractor in this project is recognized as one of the leading companies in terms of safety 
and innovative solutions in the construction industry. In this project, a safety manager 
from the general contractor was on the jobsite full time and eight safety managers from 
subcontractors supported him during site visits. Sources of evidence for this case study 
included: 1) semi-structured face-to-face interviews with the project manager, safety 
manager, and virtual design coordinator, 2) safety documents review such as 
preconstruction and pre-task safety plans, and 3) participation in weekly safety meetings 
on the jobsite for two months. 
1.2.1 Safety management process 
Construction safety management activities are typically categorized into safety 
planning and execution processes. The main tasks of safety planning include hazard 
identification, risk assessment, and preparing safety controls based on regulations, 
company safety policy, and previous experience. The safety execution process includes 
safety meetings/training and safety inspections during construction. Figure 2 illustrates 
the state-of-practice in construction safety management process. 
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Figure 2: Sate-of-practice safety management process 
During preconstruction safety planning (A11 in Figure 2), the safety manager 
generated a preconstruction safety plan to establish a comprehensive safety program, 
which was used during construction. The preconstruction safety plan includes jobsite 
hazard identification and safety execution plans generated from subcontractors. 
According to the safety manager, he never performed risk assessment since there are no 
reliable tools. The main sources of this safety plan were construction documents, safety 
specifications, regulations, a project schedule, and most importantly previous experience 
of the safety manager. Even though a project schedule was reviewed for preconstruction 
safety planning, the safety manager mentioned that safety plan and schedule integration is 
challenging because the project schedule frequently changes. Also, in spite of the fact 
that this company extensively uses building information modeling (BIM) for scheduling 
and 4D simulation, as well as design coordination, no BIM techniques were used for 
safety and the safety planning process relied significantly on traditional 2D drawings, 
paper-based resources, and previous experience of the safety manager. With the 
preconstruction safety plan, initial safety meeting was held before construction to review 
all safety plans with all employees and subcontractors. The safety plan generated in this 
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phase is a basic safety source of pre-task safety planning (A12) and regular safety 
meetings (A21). 
During construction, the safety manager hosted weekly safety meetings (A21), 
and all project participants were required to attend this meeting every Tuesday on the 
jobsite prior to work. This safety meeting started with a general safety talk, and weekly 
work plan and related safety issues were addressed by the general contractor to cover a 
ballpark of the project and safety plans. After that, daily work plans were addressed by 
each subcontractor and wrapped up with an informal safety conversation for the specific 
jobsite safety improvements by field workers. The pre-task meeting (A22) was hosted by 
each subcontractor using a check-list based pre-task plan (A12) provided from the safety 
manager. This pre-task meeting covers daily work processes and related safety topics 
without interference of the general contractor. Results of this meeting were submitted to 
the general contractor’s safety manager on a daily basis. The safety training was only 
performed with new employees to educate them regarding safety policies and related 
regulations. Lastly, jobsite safety inspections (A23) were conducted by safety managers 
as well as all members of the general contractor to prevent dangerous situations in the 
jobsite. Any hazards identified by members were easily reported to a cloud-based tool 
using their smart phones and, thus, all project participants could share information. 
In this motivating case, safety execution, including safety inspection, was well-
organized and performed intensively. However, since the pre-construction safety plan 
only addressed generic hazard types, it was not effectively used for safety execution 
practices. In addition, although the safety manager in this project recognized the 
significance of the relationship between project schedule and safety issues such as 
dangers of concurrent activities, it was not effectively communicated among project 
participants. Lastly, although the safety manager agreed that possible positive impacts of 
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integrated safety program with BIM such as early identification of preventable hazards, 
safety managers did not attend weekly BIM coordination meetings, except for in special 
circumstances, such as a tower crane erection or dismantlement process. 
1.2.2 Challenges of state-of-practice safety management 
Based on findings from the motivating case study, specific challenges related to 
construction safety management process are shown in Figure 3 and three main research 
challenges are summarized subsequently. 
 
 
Figure 3: Challenges of construction safety management process 
Current safety planning activities lack site-specific information and, when general 
safety plans are used as safety materials, safety meetings/trainings are less effective and 
result in workers not being able to identify site specific hazards and respond to them 
effectively. Due to ineffective safety planning process, safety planning and execution 
processes are generally segregated and, consequently, most safety execution processes 
rely on ad-hoc safety activities during construction. Given that the majority of hazards are 
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generated from specific-site conditions and activities in construction work zones, 
developing site-specific safety plans is fundamental in order to improve the safety 
execution process and, consequently, site specific safety management at the jobsite. 
Specific challenges related to construction safety management process are: 
 Lack of systematic safety planning method 
Current safety planning practice lacks a systematic approach to effectively 
identify and manage hazards prior to construction to reflect the dynamic nature of 
construction. Although the other project core values such as quality, time, and 
cost have been analyzed in systematic ways with numerous reliable national 
references, safety which is often referred as the most important value, still 
depends on previous experience of certified safety managers. Although tacit 
knowledge is recognized as the most valuable type of knowledge in the 
construction industry (Fischer, 2006), the quality of experience-driven safety 
planning is often highly dependent on the capability of safety managers and not 
formalized, and thus, safety knowledge is less effectively shared and 
communicated among other project participants. Due to the lack of systematic 
safety planning approach, current hazard identification and risk assessment 
processes are often too general or not conducted. 
 Lack of site-specific safety information integration 
Even though the significance of site-specific safety planning development is well 
recognized, the current safety planning approach does not address site-specific 
temporal (e.g. when and who will be exposed to potential hazards) and spatial 
(e.g. location of dangerous zone) information. When general safety plans are used 
as safety materials, safety meetings/trainings and inspections are less effective 
and result in workers not being able to identify site specific hazards and respond 
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to them effectively. Due to ineffective safety planning process, safety planning 
and execution processes are generally segregated and, consequently, most safety 
execution processes rely on ad-hoc safety activities during construction. Given 
that the majority of hazards are generated from specific-site conditions and 
activities in construction work zones, developing site-specific safety plans is 
fundamental in order to improve the safety execution process and, consequently, 
site specific safety management at the jobsite.  
 Lack of information technology use 
Another challenge of current safety planning process is lack of safety resources 
utilized. While information technology-based approaches, such as Building 
Information Modeling (BIM), have been widely used for project planning and 
progress monitoring, construction safety planning is still highly dependent on 
traditional sources such as 2D drawings, paper-based regulations, and tacit 
knowledge. The motivating case illustrates a real-world project which is 
consistent with the construction industry as a whole in which BIM is not yet 
widely used for construction safety planning. Even though the company 
extensively uses BIM for scheduling and 4D simulation, as well as design 
coordination through weekly BIM coordination meetings, construction safety still 
relies on traditional 2D drawings and paper-based sources. As a result, current 
safety planning approach limits the capability to identify and analyze hazards 
prior to construction and has the potential to be improved with the integration of 
information technology. 
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1.3 RESEARCH VISION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
I envision that the construction safety planning process can be systematically 
formalized through a 4-dimensional (4D) environment, which integrates 3D and time, to 
address site-specific temporal and spatial safety information. The proposed safety 
planning approach includes: (1) understanding of generic patterns of risk generation and 
mitigation in the dynamic construction work environment, (2) safety risk quantification, 
and (3) site-specific temporal and spatial information integration. Figure 4 illustrates an 
overview of the proposed research. 
 
 
Figure 4: Overview of the proposed research 
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I envision that safety personnel can analyze activity safety risk and prepare proper 
responses in the early stage of the project based on historical accidents data and general 
project information. The results of activity risk analysis can be integrated with a project 
schedule to incorporate safety knowledge and site-specific temporal information. The 
proposed temporal information integration process will allow identifying and prioritizing 
work period risk with baseline activity risk data. The safety schedule will be integrated 
with a project 3D model (i.e. BIM) in order to extract site-specific spatial information. 
Safety 4D simulation, which integrates activity risk data, site-specific temporal and 
spatial information, can allow safety personnel to identify concurrent activities as well as 
analyze dangerous zones in a specific time period. In addition, this visualized safety 4D 
simulation can be used for safety training. 
 Even though all safety practices are important and interrelated, I focused on 
improving the macro level of construction planning process, given that subsequent safety 
practices can be significantly impacted by macro level plans. This proposed framework 
will automatically address dynamic updates of construction document, especially project 
schedules, rather than dynamic changes of micro level work situations such as 
uncertainties of workers, logistics, weather, or activity delays which are not updated in a 
project schedule or 3D model. These kinds of micro level uncertainties should be 
considered during construction and may be integrated with the proposed macro level 
safety planning process. In addition, the proposed safety framework identifies risky 
activity, risky work periods, and risky work zones to aid safety personnel in preparing 
risk controls in advance more effectively. Therefore, specific safety controls are not 
integrated with the proposed framework. 
The following research questions have been developed in support of the 
aforementioned research vision. 
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Question 1. How can worker safety risk be transformed in a dynamic 
construction work environment? 
 Question 1.1 How can a generic pattern of risk transformation be explained in a 
dynamic construction work environment?  
 Question 1.2 What are the measurable factors (inputs) to analyze dynamic safety 
risk (outputs) of a worker? 
The first research question addresses the knowledge formalization aspect of this 
research. The answer to this question will help understand how the safety risk of a worker 
can be transformed in dynamic construction work environment. A risk generation and 
mitigation model was developed as a result. Detailed discussions related to research 
question 1 can be found in Chapter 2. 
Question 2. How can a worker’s safety risk be predicted in a quantitative 
manner? 
 Question 2.1 How can inherent safety risk of a worker be quantified by 
occupation types? 
 Question 2.2 How can inherent risk of a worker be decomposed to explain why an 
occupation type is dangerous? 
The second research question addresses the safety risk quantification aspect of 
this research based on the model developed in the first research question. The answer to 
this question will provide a reference of safety risk analysis by explaining how much and 
why a specific occupation type is dangerous. Detailed information related to research 
question 2 can be found in Chapter 3. 
Question 3. How can safety risk of multiple activities be analyzed with 
integrated site-specific temporal and spatial information? 
 13 
 Question 3.1 How can activity risk, work period risk, and work zone risk be 
predicted? 
 Question 3.2 How can safety risk data be automatically updated as a schedule and 
3D model is updated? 
The third research question addresses the temporal and spatial information 
integration aspect of this research. The answer to this question will provide practical 
application of results of research question 2 by explaining when and where a project will 
encounter dangerous situations. The results of research question 3 are shown in Chapter 
4. 
1.4 READER’S GUIDE TO THE DISSERTATION 
This PhD dissertation is structured into five chapters. Chapter 1 presents the 
introduction, motivating case with challenges, research vision and three research 
questions. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 address Research Questions 1, 2, and 3, respectively, with 
each of these chapters written as stand-alone documents that contain an introduction, 
literature review, research method, results, and conclusions sections. Chapter 5 
summarizes the dissertation’s conclusions and findings as well as future research. 
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Chapter 2 Transforming Inherent Risk in the Construction Industry: 
A Risk Generation and Control Model 
This chapter presents a risk generation and control model to describe the 
phenomenon of dynamic safety risk with construction domain knowledge. Based on 
extensive literature review and analysis of fatality reports, the proposed model addresses 
how the inherent risk of a worker can be transformed by different measurable risk factors 
such as activity resource and temporal and spatial risk factors, as well as management 
control. Successful implementation of the proposed model is expected to improve the 
understanding of safety risk and provide a theoretical basis for the development of 
practical risk analysis methods in the construction industry. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
In order to improve occupational safety and health, numerous studies have been 
conducted which can be classified into three main areas: accident analysis, risk analysis, 
and accident/risk intervention (Sousa et al. 2014). According to the Merriam-Webster 
Dictionary, accident is defined as ‘a sudden event (such as a crash) that is not planned or 
intended and that causes damage or injury (Accident 2015). Risk is defined as ‘the 
probability that something bad or unpleasant (such as an injury or a loss) will happen’ 
(Risk 2015). As seen in the definitions, the main difference between the two terms is 
timing of events. Therefore, accident analysis approaches examine problems that have 
already occurred, while risk assessment approaches study problems of future events. 
Regardless of the two different approaches, causal factors of accidents and risk should be 
identified to understand problems of accidents and risk. However, due to the nature of 
different timing of events, available sources are different for the two approaches. 
Accident analysis attempts to explain how and why accidents happened with causal 
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factors such as unsafe conditions, unsafe acts, or/and management failures. These factors 
are measurable at the time of accident analysis because undesired events already 
happened. However, most factors used for accident analysis, such as unsafe acts, cannot 
be measured at the time of risk analysis, which needs to be conducted prior to 
project/activity. Therefore, risks analysis requires different measurable sources at the 
time of analysis to identify and evaluate potential undesired events. 
A number of accident causation models have been developed to explain how and 
why accidents occurred. An accident causation model is a conceptual representation of 
accident causation, which typically explains the relationship between causes and effects 
(Qureshi 2007). Based on theoretical background from the models, various practical 
accident investigation methods have been developed. Also, specific accident models and 
methods in the construction industry were developed to reflect unique characteristics of 
the construction domain. On the other hand, many risk analysis methods have been 
developed to predict possible undesired events and mitigate them, but the area of risk 
analysis lack systematic theoretical models to explain the phenomenon of safety risk 
causation, especially in the construction domain. 
This study proposes a systematic risk generation and control model of the 
construction industry, which explains patterns of risk generation with measurable factors 
at the time of risk analysis. The proposed model addresses how inherent risk of an 
occupation can be transformed by different measurable risk factors such as activity 
resource and temporal and spatial risk factors as well as management control. The 
objectives of the model are to improve the understanding of safety risk and provide a 
theoretical background for risk analysis in the construction industry. 
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2.2 BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
A large number of occupational safety and health studies related to accident and 
risk analysis were reviewed. In order to develop a new risk generation and control model, 
previous studies related to accident causation models and accident analysis methods, and 
risk assessment methods are discussed. 
2.2.1 General Accident Causation Models 
An accident causation model is a simplified representation of accidents with the 
identification of critical causal factors and relationship among them to aid in preventing 
future reoccurrence (Qureshi 2007). There are many models describing causation of 
accident and they are generally classified into four categories: sequential, 
epidemiological, systemic, and human error models. 
Sequential accident models were relatively early attempts to describe industrial 
accidents. Heinrich’s domino model (Heinrich et al. 1950), first introduced in the late 
1920s, stated accidents as result from a chain of sequential events, metaphorically like a 
line of dominoes falling over. In Heinrich’s domino model, removal of a key event such 
as an unsafe act or unsafe condition prevents the start of the following events such as 
injury. Bird (1984) updated the domino sequence to reflect management’s relationship 
with the causes and effects of all incidents. Numerous accident analysis and risk 
assessment methods such as Failure Modes and Effects Analysis, Fault Tree Analysis, 
Event Tree Analysis, and Cause-Consequence Analysis are based on sequential accident 
models. Even though sequential accident models gained popularity and were the 
foundation for many advanced models, they were criticized because sequential accident 
models assumed the cause-effect relation between consecutive events to be  linear and 
deterministic (Abraha and Liyanage 2015). 
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Epidemiological accident models viewed that multiple factors might play a role in 
accident causation. Gordon (1949) paralleled accidents to diseases. He classified factors 
influencing accidents into the host (accident victim), agent (deliverer of the injury), and 
environment (the accident setting). The energy model, first introduced by Gibson (1961) 
and later developed by Haddon (1968),  proposed that accidents are caused by undesired 
transfers of various types of energy which influence existing barriers. The Swiss Cheese 
Model viewed accidents as a combination of ‘latent’ and ‘active’ failures within a system 
(Reason 1990; Reason 1997). Reason highlighted the pathway from latent, organizational 
failures (e.g. poor design or planning decisions), to the conditions where active failures 
(workplace errors and violations) can occur. Despite the better representation of the 
influence of multiple factors on accident causation, epidemiological accident models 
made it difficult to explain accidents in complex socio-technology systems (Hollnagel 
2004; Rasmussen 1997). 
More recent accident causation models, such as systemic accident models, 
emphasize a holistic approach towards the understanding of accidents in complex socio-
technology systems. Systemic accident models view accidents as outcomes of complex 
and dynamic interactions between system components such as human, technical, and 
environment while sequential/epidemiological accident models described accidents as a 
linear and simple cause-effect relation of events or factors (Hollnagel 2004). Rasmussen 
(1997) introduced a hierarchical socio-technical framework for modeling the 
organizational, management, and operational structures that create the preconditions for 
risk/accidents. AcciMap (Rasmussen 1997; Rasmussen and Suedung 2000) and Systems 
Theoretic Accident Model and Processes (STAMP) (Leveson 2004) are representative 
accident analysis methods based on systemic accident models. 
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In any accident causation model, human error is one of the major causes which 
leads to accidents, and a number of accident causation models focus on human behaviors 
and factors. Human error models are mostly based on the accident proneness theory 
(Greenwood and Woods 1919), indicating that individuals have specific characteristics 
which make them more or less susceptible to being involved in an accident, and later 
developed with additional contributory factors which led to human unsafe behavior. 
Goals Freedom Alertness theory (Kerr 1957), the Human-error causation model (Petersen 
1984), the McClay model (McClay 1989) and the Dejoy model (DeJoy 1990) are 
examples of human error models. 
General accident causation models provide a broad perspective of accident 
processes by representing, classifying, and organizing large amounts of general safety-
related knowledge. They explain why and how accidents occur, and a large number of 
accident/risk analysis methods have been developed based on one or multiple models. 
However, general accident causation models lack domain specific knowledge. Hence, 
several construction specific accident causation models have been developed. 
2.2.2 Accident Causation Models in Construction 
Relatively recently, several accident causation models in the construction industry 
have been developed to include construction specific knowledge. The Distraction model, 
developed by Hinze (1997), explained that the risk of an accident is generated by a 
worker’s distraction caused by either jobsite hazards or mental worries. This model 
described the interrelationships between probability of injury occurrence, efficiency of 
work accomplishment, and mental distraction experienced by the worker. Abdelhamid 
and Everett (2000) proposed the Accident Root Causes Tracing Model (ARCTM) to 
support accident investigation methods with three root causes: (1) failing to identify an 
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unsafe condition that existed before an activity was started or that developed after an 
activity was started; (2) deciding to proceed with a work activity after the worker 
identifies an existing unsafe condition; and (3) deciding to act unsafely regardless of 
initial conditions of the work environment. Suraji et al. (2001) developed the Constraint-
Response model, and classified the causes of accidents into proximal and distal factors. 
According to the model, distal factors (project conditions or management decisions) 
cause responses that generate proximal factors (unsafe condition or act) that lead to 
accidents. Haslam et al. (2005) perceived an accident mechanism with three hierarchical 
tiers, which are originating influences (client requirements, project management, or 
safety culture), shaping factors (worker’s attitude or site constraints), and immediate 
accident circumstances (condition of equipment or communication). Based on Rasmussen 
(1997), Mitropoulos et al. (2005) developed a systemic accident causation model with 
construction domain knowledge by emphasizing how production system factors affect the 
likelihood of risk/accidents during a construction operation. Later, Mitropoulos et al. 
(2009) proposed the task demand-capability model for construction safety. The model 
explained the likelihood of risk/accidents increasing as task demands increase, and 
reducing as applied capabilities increase. All accident causation models introduced 
provide a comprehensive perspective of accident causation in different mechanisms. 
Causal factors identified by previous models are mostly classified into unsafe acts, 
conditions, or/and management failures. Therefore, they are useful to provide 
frameworks for accident investigation methods, but these accident causation models 
might be difficult to support risk analysis methods, which require different measurable 
factors at the time of analysis. 
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2.2.3 Risk Assessment in Construction 
In addition to attempts of developing accident causation models, a number of risk 
assessment methods have been developed using different factors. Everett (1999) 
quantified ergonomic risks by surveying seven risk factors with safety experts. Jannadi 
and Almishari (2003) developed the Risk Assessor Model (RAM) to estimate activity risk 
using a function of severity, probability, and exposure. Lee and Halpin (2003) identified 
three risk factors and estimated risk of activities associated with utility-trenching process. 
Baradan and Usmen (2006) compared relative risks of different construction trades using 
historical fatality and non-fatal injury rates. Yi and Langford (2006) quantified activity 
risk associated with fall hazards considering several risk factors identified from historical 
fatality reports in South Korea. Wang et al. (2006) proposed a simulation-based risk 
assessment model, SimSAFE, to evaluate risk of activities with consideration of 
likelihood associated with causes of accidents based on historical accident data. 
Rozenfeld et al. (2010) proposed the Construction Job Safety Analysis (CJSA) to 
estimate risk of loss of control events identified by safety experts. In addition, several 
researchers applied the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to prioritize safety risk factors 
they identified (Aminbakhsh et al. 2013; Badri et al. 2012; Sun et al. 2008). All risk 
analysis methods introduced above contributed to the identification of the relationship 
between specific risk factors and safety performance in different ways, but their methods 
fail to represent a comprehensive view of risk problems due to the lack of theoretical 
background and limited number of factors analyzed. 
Some researchers attempted to develop risk assessment methods based on 
previous or their own risk causation models. Hallowell and Gambatese (2007) proposed 
the Safety Equilibrium Model to describe the mechanism of safety risk created from 
construction activity and safety risk mitigation generated from safety program elements. 
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Based on the model, Hallowell and Gambatese (2009) quantified risk associated with 
tasks in formwork activity using the Delphi method. Although this risk assessment 
method is based on a theoretical background, the Safety Equilibrium Model did not 
represent a comprehensive process of risk generation with a comprehensive list of factors 
and, thus, the risk assessment method fail to fully explain why certain activities are 
dangerous. Based on the model developed by Mitropoulos et al. (2009), Mitropoulos and 
Namboodiri (2010) introduced an observational method providing an objective 
assessment of an activity's task demand based on observable risk factors and production 
variables. However, as Esmaeili et al. (2015a) mentioned, the method requires identifying 
relevant factors and their relationships among them for each task. Esmaeili et al. (2015b) 
proposed an attribute-based risk analysis method inspired by the Human Genome Project 
which describes limited number of genes can explain vulnerability towards specific kind 
of diseases. Based on the theoretical background, Esmaeili et al. (2015b) identified and 
quantified limited number of primary and secondary measurable attributes of struck-by 
accidents. This attribute-based risk assessment model enables one to address the dynamic 
nature of a construction activity with safety attributes being selected by users depending 
on the work environment of an activity. However, the Human Genome Project is not a 
model to describe the phenomenon of risk or accidents. In addition, their risk analysis 
method assumed the risks of attributes are static and limited to struck-by accidents only.  
The extensive literature reveals that accident causation models in the construction 
industry comprehensively describe accidents with well-defined factors. As a result, these 
models enable the support of accident investigation methods, but fail to provide a 
theoretical background for risk assessment methods, which require understanding of risk 
development based on measurable factors at the time of risk analysis. In addition, even 
though a number of risk assessment methods have been developed with construction 
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domain knowledge, they failed to represent a comprehensive view of risk problems due 
to the lack of theoretical background and limited number of factors analyzed. Therefore, 
there is a need to develop a comprehensive model which enables a better understanding 
of the phenomenon of dynamic safety risk with sufficient construction domain 
knowledge. 
2.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
In order to understand how and why risk is generated, this study examined 32 
fatality reports obtained from the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health 
(NIOSH) Fatality Assessment Control and Evaluation (FACE) program. Even though the 
NIOSH investigators identified causes of accidents in reports such as unsafe acts and 
conditions, the authors focused on identifying patterns of risk generation based on 
measurable factors for the purpose of risk analysis. Out of 32 cases, 24 (75%) were used 
for training and eight (25%) were used for testing. 
2.3.1 Patterns of Risk Generation 
The principle of the proposed risk generation model is with the underlying 
assumption that every worker has an inherent risk. The extent and types of inherent risk 
varies depending upon his/her occupation type which determines a large number of risk 
factors. For example, a roofer might have high risk related to fall from roofs because of 
the nature of work location. On the other hand, a concrete worker might have relatively 
high risk of being struck by a vehicle such as a backing cement mixer due to the nature of 
working with construction equipment.  Therefore, it is important to understand that 
different occupations perform fundamentally different types of work and have different 
exposure to risk types and factors.  
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A worker performing a particular activity may be prone to a certain level of risk. 
There are a number of risks present in activity. These risks in an activity typically vary 
depending on resources, such as materials and tools, to perform the activity. For example, 
there may be different levels of risks when a carpenter performs the same elevated work 
using different tools such as a ladder versus scaffolding. Therefore, inherent risk of an 
occupation can vary by types of resources to perform a particular activity. 
Unlike what happens in other activities having static and indoor work 
environment, construction activities are highly influenced by temporal and spatial 
contexts of a jobsite.  An activity risk will vary by work duration since work duration 
typically determines the extent of exposure to risk. An activity risk will vary by work 
location although the crews are working with the same resources such as pouring 
concrete on the ground or on the top floor.  Also, the level of risk associated with an 
activity can differ by existence of concurrent activities. For example, pouring concrete 
activity may be performed early in the morning without any other activities, but it may 
also be performed at peak times, with several concurrent activities. Therefore, it is 
important to understand safety impacts of concurrent activities, which can be determined 
by temporal and spatial contexts of a project. 
Activity risk explains how inherent safety risk of an occupation can be changed 
by resources utilized, as well as temporal and spatial contexts of a project. In order to 
mitigate expected risk, a construction project typically has safety management practices, 
such as safety trainings and safety inspections on the jobsite. While activity risk explains 
a generation aspect of safety risk, safety management explains a control aspect of safety 
risk. For example, the level of risk using a ladder by a carpenter can be reduced with 
training on proper use of ladders prior to an activity. Also, level of risk of pouring 
concrete activity and nearby activities can be minimized by placing a spotter or 
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reinforcing safety inspections on the area of the activities even though these activities are 
inevitably scheduled at the same time and same location. 
Even though management control is well established and implemented, there is 
always a chance of residual safety risk because all unsafe conditions and unsafe acts 
cannot be predicted and mitigated by safety controls. These uncontrolled remaining risks 
may potentially lead to accidents and injuries to workers. However, understanding the 
mechanism of risk generation and proper management control can minimize the extent of 
risk and consequently, the probability of undesired events could be minimized. 
2.3.2 Measurable Risk Factors 
The previous section explains the general pattern of risk generation in the 
construction industry. In order to support risk assessment methods, identification of 
measurable factors of each category is necessary for better understanding.  
Prior to identifying a number of measurable factors (causes), a list of common 
risk types (effects) was identified. Different construction occupations are exposed to 
different types of risk. Therefore, understanding common risk types is important for the 
development of practical risk assessment methods. Based on the Occupational Injury and 
Illness Classification System (OIICS), seven high level risk types are shown in Table 1. 








Table 1: Risk Types 
Code Risk types 
R1 Violence and other injuries by persons or animals 
R2 Transportation incidents 
R3 Fires and explosions 
R4 Falls, slips, trips 
R5 Exposure to harmful substances or environments 
R6 Contact with objects and equipment 
R7 Overexertion and bodily reaction 
Source: Occupational Injury and Illness Classification System (OIICS) 
As described in the section 2.3.1, risk of a worker varies by resources the worker 
uses and work conditions in an activity. In addition, these activity resources typically 
determine risk types workers will be exposed to. For example, a carpenter working with a 
ladder has a high probability of being exposed to ‘Falls, slips, trips’ (R4) risk. Table 2 
summarizes eight common activity risk factors based on the SIICS. Definitions and 
detailed activity risk factors can be found at ‘Sources of Injury’ in the SIICS. 
Table 2: Activity Risk Factors 
Code Activity risk factors 
ARF1 Chemicals and chemical products 
ARF2 Containers, furniture and fixtures 
ARF3 Machinery 
ARF4 Parts and materials 
ARF5 Persons, plants, animals, and minerals 
ARF6 Tools, instruments, and equipment 
ARF7 Vehicles 
ARF8 Other sources 
Source: Occupational Injury and Illness Classification System (OIICS) 
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Due to the dynamic nature of work environment in Construction, temporal and 
spatial contexts highly influence an activity’s risk. As Jannadi and Almishari (2003) 
introduced, the amount of exposure to risk is an important factor typically determined by 
work duration. Also, from the analysis of fatality reports, time of work and work location 
play significant roles to determine the type and amount of risk in a seemingly identical 
activity performed with the same resources. Lastly, as Hallowell et al. (2011) 
emphasized, construction activities are often influenced by risk caused by nearby 
activities. Therefore, it is important to analyze safety impacts of concurrent activities 
which are determined by a project’s temporal and spatial information. Table 3 
summarizes four temporal and spatial risk factors. 
Table 3: Temporal and Spatial Risk Factors 
Code Temporal and spatial risk factors 
TSRF1 Work duration 
TSRF2 Time of work 
TSRF3 Work location 
TSRF4 Concurrent activities 
Most accident causation models as well as risk assessment methods addressed 
safety management practices playing an important role in reducing risk/accidents. While 
activity risk factors and temporal and spatial risk factors influence the generation aspect 
of safety risk, safety management controls influence the mitigation aspect of safety risk. 
Rajendran and Gambatese (2009) found more than 300 safety management strategies in 
the construction industry. Since it is impractical including all safety management 
strategies, this study adapted nine fundamental strategies (SMC1 – 9) identified by Hinze 
(2002) and two additional controls (SMC10 – 11) identified from the analysis of fatality 
reports as shown in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Safety Management Controls 
Code Safety management controls 
SMC1 Demonstrated management commitment 
SMC2 Staffing for safety 
SMC3 Pre-project and pre-task planning 
SMC4 Safety education and training 
SMC5 Employment involvement 
SMC6 Safety recognition and rewards 
SMC7 Accident/incident investigations 
SMC8 Drug testing 
SMC9 Subcontractor management 
SMC10 Safety protection system 
SMC11 Others 
3.4 PROPOSED RISK CAUSATION MODEL 
In the section 2.3, a general pattern of risk generation and mitigation was 
explained with three types of measurable contexts related to a construction project. Based 
on these findings, the complete risk generation and control model is proposed in Figure 5 
to illustrate the safety risk transformation process – from inherent risk to undesired 
events, with specific factors related to available information. 
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Figure 5: Risk generation and control model 
The proposed risk generation and control models can be used in different project 
stages with available information. As shown in Figure 5, inherent risk (R1-7) represents 
the baseline assumption that every worker has a chance to be exposed to any types of risk 
and the extent and types of his/her inherent risk varies by his/her occupation type. 
Inherent risk should explain the overall safety risk of an occupation and include types and 
the extent of risk in a quantitative manner to be compared with other occupation types.  
According to the BLS in 2013, reinforcing iron and rebar workers are 1.6 times more 
likely exposed to days away injuries than the construction average. In particular, this 
occupation is 2.5 and 1.6 times more likely exposed to ‘Overexertion and bodily reaction’ 
(R7) and ‘Falls, slips, trips’ (R4), respectively, as compared to the selected risk types of 
the construction average. Inherent risk in the model explains general risk of a worker and 
can be used in the early stage of a project to prioritize high risk occupations and prepare 
safety actions in advance. 
Any occupation performs a number of activities. When an activity is assigned to a 
worker, the extent and type of inherent risk will be specified because the activity 
determines the resources a worker will use to perform the activity. Therefore, activity risk 
(AR1-7) in the proposed model is a specified version of inherent risk of a selected 
occupation with activity resource information. In order to understand the transformation 
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process from inherent risk to activity risk, the relationship between risk types and activity 
risk factors (ARF1-8) should be defined. For example, Esmaeili et al. (2015b) analyzed 
the cause and effect relationship between struck-by risk and a number of predictable 
factors in a quantitative manner. Activity risk can be evaluated when representative 
activity information, such as equipment or materials, is determined. 
Activity risk explained in the model assumes that activity is not influenced by 
time and location related factors. When specific temporal and spatial contexts of the 
activities such as work duration, location, or existence of concurrent activities are 
determined, activity risk will be further specified. Temporal and spatial risk factors 
(TSRF 1-4) can be obtained from project documents such as a project schedule, and play 
a role to intensify existing activity risk or create new risk types. For example, the 
possibility of stuck-by risk when a laborer is working with dump truck will be increased 
when the activity is performed at night. Also, when this activity is performed on a 
shoulder of a highway, new risks type such as transportation incidents caused by 
passenger vehicles can be generated. Therefore, to analyze site-specific activity risk 
(SSAR1-7), the cause and effect relationship between risk types and temporal/spatial risk 
factors should be identified.  
While activity and site-specific activity risks explain the perspective of risk 
generation depending on specific contexts of activity, safety management controls (SMC 
1-11) explain the side of risk mitigation. For example, roofers working on installing 
shingles on a roof have high risk of falling to the lower level, which is determined by 
resources and spatial contexts of the activity. When proper fall protection systems, such 
as guardrail, safety net, or personal fall arrest systems, are planned and implemented, the 
extent of such risk can be mitigated. Even though extensive safety management controls 
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are prepared, there is always a chance that risk may be uncontrolled leading to undesired 
events (UE 1-7). 
3.5 MODEL APPLICATION 
The proposed model demonstrates the process of risk generation and mitigation 
with activity risk factors, temporal and spatial risk factors, and safety management 
controls. Having produced the model, the next stage of the research was to apply the 
model to real-world cases. The purpose of the application was to understand how well the 
proposed model can explain the general process of risk generation and mitigation on 
actual accident cases. As mentioned earlier, eight out of 32 fatality cases randomly 
selected from the NIOSH FACE program were used for model application. To provide 
further context, two representative cases of the eight are discussed in detail subsequently 
and the rest of analyzes can be found in Appendix A. 
 
 
Figure 6: Fatality analysis I 
Figure 6 summarized the process of risk generation leading to a fatality. At the 
time of the accident, a 17-year-old female laborer was working on replacing shingles of a 
residential roof. According to the Bureau of Labor Statistics, construction laborers 
showed 1.6 times higher fatality rate than the construction average in 2013 and common 
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risk types related to fatalities were ‘Falls, slips, trips’ (R4), ‘Transportation incidents’ 
(R2), and ‘Contact with objects and equipment’ (R6) representing 42.8%, 19.5%, and 
17.2%, respectively. Based on the accident description, the laborer was involved with two 
predictable activity risk factors, shingles which belong to ‘Parts and materials’ (ARF4) 
and forklift which is a part of ‘Vehicles’ (ARF7), and a site-specific risk factor, working 
on a roof (TSRF3). As a result, this worker was expected to have two types of activity 
risk which are ‘Contact with objects and equipment’ (AR6) due to forklift (ARF7) and 
‘Overexertion and bodily reaction’ (AR7) due to shingles (ARF4). In addition, a spatial 
context, working on a roof, created an additional risk of ‘Falls, slips, trips’ (SSAR4). The 
case did not provide detailed information of safety management controls the project 
implemented, but mainly the jobsite failed to implement safety training (SMC4), safety 
protection systems (SMC10), and child labor laws (SMC11). As a result, three types of 
risk remained, leading to a fatality caused by falling from a roof (UE4). 
 
 
Figure 7: Fatality analysis II 
In the second case, a 34-year-old State Department of Transportation worker was 
preparing for a trench excavation for the following day. The occupation of the victim was 
not specified in this case. As shown in Figure 7, no critical activity risk factors were 
observed in the activity. However, the victim was working on a shoulder of a highway 
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(TSRF3) with public traffic (TSRF4). Due to two temporal and spatial risk factors, the 
victim was exposed to the risk of ‘Transportation incidents’ (SSAR4) and struck by a 
motor vehicle leading to death. The report recommended additional traffic control 
devices to prevent the accident, but no more information was provided in terms of safety 
management controls they implemented. 
Even though only two representative cases were introduced, all test cases shown 
in Appendix A successfully explained how risk of a worker was specified by activity, and 
temporal and spatial risk factors. There was limited information for factors associated 
with the activities the victim performed because the reports focused on identifying critical 
causal factors of fatalities. With more detailed information, more comprehensive risk 
analysis can be performed. 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
To enhance the assessment and understanding of why accidents occur, several 
accident causation models have been developed for the construction industry. These 
models successfully describe accident causation with comprehensive causal factors and 
enable the support of accident investigation methods. With growing recognition of 
proactive safety management, a number of risk analysis methods have been introduced 
with construction domain knowledge. However, most current risk analysis methods in the 
construction industry lack a theoretical background and analyzed risk with limited 
number of measurable factors. 
This chapter proposes a risk generation and control model which describes the 
phenomenon of dynamic safety risk with construction domain knowledge. Based on 
extensive literature review and analysis of 32 fatality reports from the NIOSH FACE 
program, the pattern of risk generation and mitigation was examined with predictable risk 
 33 
factors. The model assumes that every worker has inherent risk. When an activity is 
assigned to a worker, his/her risk is specified based on a number of activity risk and 
temporal/spatial risk factors. These specified activity risks may be mitigated by 
management control, and uncontrolled risk results in undesired events.  
This chapter focused on providing a theoretical model to aid in practical risk 
assessment methods by understanding the process of risk generation and mitigation. The 
following chapter will examine safety risk in quantitative manner. 
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Chapter 3 Assessing Safety Risk in Different Construction Trades: A 
Quantitative Approach 
This chapter proposes an innovative quantitative safety risk quantification model 
to analyze dynamic safety risks for different occupations. In order to consider the 
dynamic nature of safety risk, models were created for 17 different construction 
occupations based on injury severities, risk types, and sources of injuries. Two relative 
injury rates, relative fatality and relative days away injury rates were used to compare 
relative safety risks among different trade workers. The findings indicate different 
occupations were exposed to different types of risks and sources of injuries. In addition, 
the same occupation had different risk types and sources of injury depending on different 
injury severities. A construction project typically involves numerous workers and 
resources. The safety risk analysis presented in this chapter can be used by safety 
managers to understand the dynamic nature of safety risk and aid in preparing safety 
actions such as inspections or trainings more effectively by focusing on high-risk 
occupations, risk types, or sources. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The construction industry has one of the worst occupational health and safety 
records of any industries. The Bureau of Labor Statistics in 2013 indicate that the 
construction industry employs approximately 5.2% of the work force, but accounts for 
8.9% of occupational injuries and 20.2% of all occupational fatalities in the United States 
(BLS 2013). In spite of stringent regulations and much attention towards reducing risks in 
the physical environment, the construction industry continues to be associated with high 
levels of accidents, injuries and illnesses. 
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The high level of risk in the construction industry has been explained by inherent 
characteristics of the construction industry. One of unique characteristics is the dynamic 
nature of the construction work environment. Unlike what happens in other industries 
having static and indoor work environment, construction sites are very dynamic in terms 
of ground condition, temporal structure, weather conditions, and equipment (Fredericks 
et al. 2005). The coexistence of work teams with different tasks working in a common 
area increases the complexity of safety risk profiles. Also, the work teams are in constant 
rotation throughout the project and their members may also change along the way (Carter 
and Smith 2006; Hinze 1997; Hinze and Wilson 2000; Yi and Langford 2006).  
The most effective way for improving safety performance is to prevent accidents 
before they occur. In this manner, proactive risk management is important. Typical risk 
management includes a three-step process: risk identification, risk assessment, and risk 
mitigation (Tixier et al. 2002). Hallowell and Gambatese (2009) stated typical methods of 
risk assessment in construction practice focus more on risk identification, and risk 
evaluation process is typically performed through subjective safety experts’ judgement. 
Due to the lack of tools, frequent and thorough risk analyses at construction sites are 
hardly ever performed. (Tang et al. 1997). Moreover, hazard identification levels are 
often far from ideal (Carter and Smith 2006). Also, Rozenfeld et al. (2009) pointed out 
that risk levels in construction settings fluctuate with dynamic work environment and, 
thus, uniform levels of investment in proactive safety measures can be illusive and 
inefficient.  
This chapter proposes an innovative safety risk quantification model to 
understand the dynamic nature of safety risks. By dynamic, I mean the constant changes 
that occur in the context of work zones in the construction work environment. The 
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proposed model analyzed different risk types and sources of injury associated to different 
construction occupations based on historical accidents data. 
3.2 BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
In construction project management, safety risk management is important to 
identify potential hazards, evaluate the risks associated with the hazards, and mitigate 
them before they occur. As Hallowell and Gambatese (2009) stated, current construction 
risk management practices focus on risk identification and there is a lack of tools for 
objective risk assessment. In this section, studies related to risk assessment were 
reviewed to develop and frame a new risk assessment methodology. Particularly, three 
aspects of risk assessment were reviewed and compared: primary functions for safety risk 
assessment, data collection methodology, and target unit of analysis. 
Risk has been defined in a variety of ways. As the most common approach, risk is 
considered as a product of probability and severity. For example, Kumamoto and Henley 
(1996) defined risk as a collection of all possible pairs of likelihoods and outcomes. 
Probability is typically defined in terms of the number of injuries or illnesses per worker-
hours; severity is defined by the average outcome of the injury or illness (Esmaeili and 
Hallowell 2013). With this definition, many studies (Baradan and Usmen 2006; Cuny and 
Lejeune 1999; Esmaeili et al. 2015b; Rozenfeld et al. 2010) focused on the assessment of 
probability and severity of potential incidents. In addition, Jannadi and Almishari (2003) 
defined risk as a measure of the probability, severity, and exposure of all the hazards of 
an activity. Exposure, defined in units of time, typically describes the total time an 
individual or crew is exposed to a risk (Esmaeili and Hallowell 2013). After Jannadi and 
Almishari (2003) introduced the third dimension, exposure, to quantify safety risk, 
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several authors (Esmaeili and Hallowell 2013; Jannadi and Almishari 2003; Rozenfeld et 
al. 2009) quantified safety risk as a product of probability, severity, and exposure.  
Even though risk assessment typically involves quantifying safety risks on 
numerical ways using a combination of three dimensions, safety risk assessment 
approaches differ primarily based on how they assess the probability, severity, or 
exposure. Two main approaches are using expert opinions and historical data (Esmaeili et 
al. 2015a; Esmaeili et al. 2015b; Mitropoulos and Namboodiri 2010). Very few 
construction firms have the quantity and quality of data needed to perform meaningful 
safety risk analysis. As a result, several researchers used subjective safety experts’ 
judgement to quantify safety risk. For example, Everett (1999) identified seven common 
risk factors related to overexertion injuries and quantified each risk using ordinal scoring 
system (1-3) obtained from expert judgement. Jannadi and Almishari (2003) proposed a 
risk assessor model (RAM) to quantify the safety risk associated with a particular 
activity. In their model, activity risk score was calculated using a function of severity, 
exposure, and probability, which was determined by end-users. Lee and Halpin (2003) 
developed a fuzzy logic model with safety expert input to predict safety risk of activities 
related to utility-trenching process based on three critical risk factors: preplanning, 
training, and supervision. Rozenfeld et al. (2010) proposed ‘Construction Job Safety 
Analysis’ (CJSA) for proactive safety risk assessment. Based on extensive survey with 
safety experts, loss of control events were identified at work stage level and associated 
risk of each loss of control event was quantified with potential probability and severity 
determined by users. Although survey-based risk quantification approach enables the use 
of experiential knowledge of safety professionals, which might be the most valuable asset 
of the construction industry, this approach cannot escape from biases of subjective 
judgement. To minimize biases inherent in a survey approach, Hallowell and Gambatese 
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(2009) quantified severity and the average of frequency for 13 activities using Dephi 
method. The degree of exposure collected from field observations was then combined 
with severity and frequency values to quantify a final activity risk. In addition, several 
researchers applied the analytic hierarchy process (AHP) to prioritize safety risk factors 
they identified (Aminbakhsh et al. 2013; Badri et al. 2012; Sun et al. 2008). 
Other researchers have used statistical injury data to develop a priori estimates of 
safety risks. In this approach, researchers use historical accident data from national 
databases such as the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) or accident reports from 
individual companies. For example, Baradan and Usmen (2006) analyzed relative risks of 
16 building trades based on fatal and nonfatal injury data from BLS. Yi and Langford 
(2006) attempted to estimate activity risk associated with fall hazards considering 
physical environmental and work process risk factors collected from fatality reports 
provided by the Korean Occupational Safety and Health Agency. Fung et al. (2010) 
estimated relative risks of 14 representative construction trades in Hong Kong with 18 
types of accidents by considering frequency and severity based on historical accident 
data. Jacinto and Silva (2010) proposed a semi-quantitative risk assessment methodology 
in the shipbuilding industry. A bow-tie technique was explored to explain causation and 
consequence of specific struck-by accident by considering likelihood and potential 
severity obtained from national historical accident data. Wang et al. (2006) proposed a 
simulation-based risk assessment model, SimSAFE, to assess the hazard for each activity. 
The model simulated a list of activity risk by considering estimated likelihood associated 
with causes of accidents based on historical accident data. Esmaeili et al. (2015b) 
developed an attribute-based risk assessment model. Using numerous accident reports 
obtained from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) Integrated 
Management Information System (IMIS), measureable safety attributes were identified 
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and probability of struck-by accident in a specific activity scenario was quantified from 
the combination of related safety attributes. Maiti and Bhattacherjee (1999) examined 
effects of five safety factors on degree of injuries to miners in India. Based on four years 
data for both the injured and uninjured miners, relative effect of each factor on degree of 
injuries was analyzed using logistic aggression approach. 
In addition to data collection approaches, target units of risk assessment also vary, 
such as project-, trade-, activity-, or attribute-level. Sun et al. (2008) assessed the risky 
level of Beijing Olympic venues construction projects, and Baradan and Usmen (2006) 
compared riskiness of 16 construction trades. These units of analyses enable the 
comparison of high level inherent risk, but fail to provide detailed potential hazards 
generated from the dynamic nature of construction process. Several researchers attempted 
to quantify safety risk at an activity level (Esmaeili and Hallowell 2013; Everett 1999; 
Hallowell and Gambatese 2009; Jannadi and Almishari 2003; Lee and Halpin 2003; Yi 
and Langford 2006). However, as Esmaeili et al. (2015a) pointed out, quantifying safety 
risks of all construction activities are impractical and time-consuming, especially when a 
survey-based data collection method is adapted. Recently, Esmaeili et al. (2015b) 
introduced an attribute-based risk analysis approach. In their model, safety risk of an 
activity is quantified based on a combination of safety risks of predictable attributes 
quantified from historical data. This attribute-based risk assessment model enables one to 
address the dynamic nature of a construction activity with safety attributes being selected 
by users depending on the work environment of an activity. However, the current 
attribute-based risk assessment model has two limitations. First, the model is limited to 
analysis of struck-by hazards types, which need to be extended to other hazard types, 
such as fall hazard. Second, this model assumed that a risk score of an attribute would be 
the same regardless of different trades. However, different occupations might have 
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different frequency and severity of safety attributes. For example, a roofer and a 
construction equipment operator might have different risk when they use the same tool, 
such as a ladder, because the location or purpose of use of the ladder is inherently 
different. 
The extensive literature shows that using empirical data is important to obtain 
reliable risk assessment. Also, to address the dynamic nature of construction work 
process, an attribute-based risk assessment considering the unique nature of different 
trades is needed. 
3.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
3.3.1 Conceptual Safety Risk Quantification Model 
The underlying assumption of the proposed risk quantification model is that every 
worker contains an inherent risk. However, the extent of inherent risk varies by 
occupations due to the unique activity assigned to them. Depending on the nature of an 
activity assigned to different occupations, inherent injury types vary. For example, 
roofers have higher fatality rates when compared to other occupations due to the nature of 
working at height. Reinforcing iron and rebar workers have more possibilities of getting 
injured, mostly days away injuries because reinforcing iron and rebar workers are likely 
to work on unstable/uneven surfaces, especially working on rebar. Risk types such as 
falls or struck-by objects vary by injury types as well as different occupations. According 
to the BLS 2013, ‘falls, slips, and trips’ was the most prevalent events of fatalities while 
‘contact with objects and equipment’ was the major events of days away injuries within 
construction trade workers. Therefore, safety risk of different occupations should be 
analyzed by different injury severities and risk types to understand dynamic nature of 
safety risk. In addition, each risk type for every occupation has different sources of 
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injuries. For example, ladders are used extensively by painters and, thus, ladders are one 
of main sources of fall hazards within painters. Structural iron and steel workers 
frequently involve heavy material transportation, and, thus, are easily exposed to hazards 
related to struck-by objects. By quantifying safety risks of sources by risk types, the 
proposed model enables the understanding of how the extent of certain hazard types can 
vary depending on sources utilized within an activity. Figure 8 conceptually illustrates 
the scenarios explained above. 
 
 
Figure 8: Conceptual risk assessment model 
3.3.2 Data Collection 
The BLS Injuries, Illnesses, and Fatalities (IIF) program provides several 
historical statistics related to injury severities, risk types, and sources of injury by 
different occupations. Within the BLS IIF program, fatalities and days away injuries have 
been collected from the Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (CFOI) and Survey of 
Occupational Injury and Illness (SOII), respectively. The BLS CFOI has collected 
occupational fatal injury data from both private and public sectors while the BLS SOII 
has estimated non-fatal workplace injuries and illnesses from the private sector. For 
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consistency, injury data from only the private sector was reviewed for both fatal and days 
away injury data. Accident types and primary sources of injuries were classified based on 
Occupational Injury and Illness Classification System (OIICS). In terms of occupation 
data, 19 construction occupations were selected based on the 2010 Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC) system which was adapted for the BLS CFOI and SOII. In addition, 
to normalize the number of two injury cases by the number of employment, employment 
size in the private sector of different occupations was collected from the BLS 
Occupational Employment Statistics (OES). In this study, all data analyzed were from the 
2013 private construction sector. Figure 9 summarizes data sources and classification 
systems used for this study. 
 
 
Figure 9: Data sources and classification systems 
3.3.3 Analysis Steps 
Identification overall relative safety risk by occupations 
In order to analyze safety risk of different construction occupations, first of all, 
overall safety risks of 19 different construction trades were analyzed in terms of two 
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injury severities, fatality and days away injury. To quantify the overall safety risks 
associated with 19 construction occupations, historical injury data was reviewed. The 
objective was to quantify and compare relative safety risk of different construction 
occupations based on historical accident data. From the BLS CFOI and OES, fatality rate 
was calculated representing the number of fatalities per 100,000 full time equivalent 
workers. Days away injury rate was calculated based on the BLS SOII and OES, and this 
rate represents the number of days away injuries per 10,000 full time equivalent workers. 
In order to compare with construction average injury rate, two types of relative injury 
rates, relative fatality rate (RFR) and relative days away injury rate (RDAIR), were 
created. Relative fatality and days away injury rates of an occupation i, denoted as RFRi 
and RDAIRi are represented as: 
 
Relative fatality ratei (RFR) = Fatality ratei / Fatality rateavg. 
Relative days away injury ratei (RDAIR) = Days away injury ratei / Days away injury 
ratei. 
In which fatality ratei and fatality rateavg denotes a fatality rate of occupation i and 
average of construction trade workers, respectively, and days away injury ratei and days 
away injury rateavg indicates a days away injury rate of occupation i and average of 
construction trade workers, respectively. 
Two relative safety injury rates used in this chapter enable the understanding of 
how different construction occupations have different safety risks by two different injury 
severity types compared to overall construction trade workers. 
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Identify specific risk types by occupations 
Even though two relative injury rates provide overall risk level of different 
construction occupations, these indicators cannot explain which accident types specific 
occupations are more frequently exposed to. Therefore, quantifying specific risk types by 
different occupations is valuable.  
The first step of quantifying specific risk types is the classification of common 
construction safety risks. In this analysis, the Occupational Injury and Illness 
Classification System (OIICS) was selected to define and classify safety risk types. The 
OIICS defines ‘Events or Exposure’ of injuries at four hierarchical levels with four digit 
code systems, henceforth denoted as ‘E’. The OIICS includes seven 1st level, 48 2nd 
level, 178 3rd level, and 304 4th level injury types. For example, ‘Falls, Slips, Trips’ (E4) 
has seven 2nd level injury types including ‘Fall to lower level’ (E43), and E43 can break 
down into four additional 3rd level injury types including ‘Fall through surface or 
existing opening’ (E432) which further breaks down into eight 4th level injury types such 
as ‘Fall through surface or existing opening 11 to 15 feet’ (E4323). After defining 
specific risk types, number of fatalities and days away injuries by detailed risk types were 
collected from the BLS CFOI and SOII, respectively. Due to the data availability, both 
fatality and days away injury data was analyzed by 2nd level injury types by different 
occupations. 
Identify specific sources by specific risks  
Identification of specific risk types enables the understanding of how different 
construction trades are exposed to different risk types. However, there is still no 
information about sources of risks, which can help explain why certain risk will possibly 
happen. Therefore, understanding common sources of injuries by different occupations is 
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important. Also, possible accident scenarios can be obtained by linking specific sources 
of injuries and specific risk types since they have a cause and effect relationship. 
First of all, common sources of injuries were identified from the OIICS. Similarly 
to risk types, the OIICS classified ‘Primary Sources of Injury’ at four hierarchical level 
with corresponding codes, denoted as ‘S’ in the rest of paper. The OIICS defines nine 1st 
level, 78 2nd level, 439 3rd level, and 1139 4th level sources of injury. For example, 
‘Tools, Instruments, and Equipment’ (S7) has 10 2nd level sources of injury including 
‘Ladders’ (S74), and S74 can break down into four additional 3rd level sources including 
‘Ladders – movable’ (S742) which further break down into six 4th level sources such as 
‘Extension ladders’ (S7421). With the definition of sources, numbers of fatalities and 
days away injuries by detailed sources of injury were analyzed from the BLS CFOI and 
SOII, respectively. In addition to the identification of common sources of injuries by 
different construction trades, common injury scenarios were identified by linking sources 
of injury and risk types. Due to the data availability, sources of injury were also analyzed 
by 2nd level. Therefore, the analysis in this study is limited to 2nd levels of risk types and 
sources of injury. For instance, a possible injury scenario is ‘Fall to lower level’ (E43) 
due to ‘Ladders’ (S74). 
3.4 RESULTS 
3.4.1 Overall Risk by Occupations 
During the data analysis, two occupations out of 19 were excluded due to the 
relatively small employment sizes and a significant amount of missing data. Therefore, a 
total of 17 construction occupations and overall construction trade workers were selected 
for the analysis as shown in Table 5. 
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Table 5: Construction Occupations and Corresponding Codes 
Code Title Code Title 
47-2000 Construction Trades Workers 47-2120 Glaziers 
47-2020 Brickmasons, Blockmasons, and 
Stonemasons 
47-2130 Insulation Workers 
47-2030 Carpenters 47-2140 Painters and Paperhangers 
47-2040 Carpet, Floor, and Tile Installers and 
Finishers 
47-2150 Pipelayers, Plumbers, Pipefitters, and 
Steamfitters 
47-2050 Cement Masons, Concrete Finishers, 
and Terrazzo Workers 
47-2160 Plasterers and Stucco Masons 
47-2060 Construction Laborers 47-2170 Reinforcing Iron and Rebar Workers 
47-2070 Construction Equipment Operators 47-2180 Roofers 
47-2080 Drywall Installers, Ceiling Tile 
Installers, and Tapers 
47-2210 Sheet Metal Workers 
47-2110 Electricians 47-2220 Structural Iron and Steel Workers 
 Source: Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) 
For each occupation, two relative injury rates in 2013 were estimated as 
illustrated in Figure 10. In this figure, the x-axis indicates relative days away injury rate 
(RDAIR) and the y-axis represents relative fatality rate (RFR). The dotted vertical and 
horizontal lines at 100 indicate the average days away injury and fatality rates for overall 
construction trade workers. 
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Figure 10: RFR and RDAIR for 17 construction occupations (Red: high RFR and high 
RDAIR, Purple: high RFR and low RDAIR, Orange: low RFR and high 
RDAIR, Green: low RFR and low RDAIR) 
As shown in Figure 10, different construction trades had different injury 
frequencies in terms of two injury severity types, fatality and days away injury. For 
example, roofers (47-2180) had extremely high fatality rate, more than 4.5 times higher 
than the construction average, while reinforcing iron and rebar workers (47-2170) 
experienced the highest days away injury rate, approximately 1.65 times higher than the 
construction average, with no fatalities in 2013. In addition, roofers (47-2180), 
construction laborers (47-2060), and painters and paperhangers (47-2140) were examined 
as dangerous occupations in terms of both injury indicators compared to the overall 
construction trade workers. Analysis of RFR and RDAIR shows that different 
construction occupations have different inherent risks. 
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3.4.2 Specific Risk by Occupations 
Two relative injury indicators in Figure 10 represent the overall fatality and days 
away injury rates of different construction occupations compared to the construction 
industry average in 2013. However, there is a need to identify specific risk types related 
to each occupation because different safety actions should be required depending on 
expected risk types. For example, construction laborer (47-2060) and painters and 
paperhangers (47-2140) in Figure 10 showed similar RFR and RDAIR, but they require 
different safety barriers to mitigate their risks due to the different specific risk types of 
the two occupations.  
Out of seven 1st level and 48 2nd level risk types identified from the OIICS, all of 
1st level and 33 2nd level risk types were related to either fatality or days away injury 
within construction trade workers in 2013. In the analysis, six 1st level (except for 
‘FIRES AND EXPLOSIONS’ (E3)) and 26 2nd level risk types were finally selected by 
discarding risk types with lower than 1.0 of RFR and RDAIR. Table 6 summarizes final 


















Code Title Code Title 
E1 VIOLENCE AND OTHER 
INJURIES BY PERSONS OR 
ANIMALS 
E11 Intentional injury by person 
E12 Injury by person—unintentional or intent unknown 
E2 TRANSPORTATION 
INCIDENTS 
E22 Rail vehicle incidents 
E24 Pedestrian vehicular incidents 
E25 Water vehicle incidents 
E26 Roadway incidents involving motorized land vehicle 
E27 Nonroadway incidents involving motorized land 
vehicles 
E4 FALLS, SLIPS, TRIPS E40 Fall, slip, trip, unspecified 
E41 Slip or trip without fall 
E42 Falls on same level  
E43 Falls to lower level 
E44 Jumps to lower level 
E5 EXPOSURE TO HARMFUL 
SUBSTANCES OR 
ENVIRONMENTS 
E51 Exposure to electricity 
E53 Exposure to temperature extremes 
E55 Exposure to other harmful substances 
E56 Exposure to oxygen deficiency, n.e.c. 
E6 CONTACT WITH OBJECTS 
AND EQUIPMENT 
E60 Contact with objects and equipment, unspecified 
E62 Struck by object or equipment 
E63 Struck against object or equipment 
E64 Caught in or compressed by equipment or objects 
E65 Struck, caught, or crushed in collapsing structure, 
equipment, or material 
E66 Rubbed or abraded by friction or pressure 
E7 OVEREXERTION AND 
BODILY REACTION 
E70 Overexertion and bodily reaction, unspecified 
E71 Overexertion involving outside sources 
E72 Repetitive motions involving microtasks 
E73 Other exertions or bodily reactions 
 Source: Occupational Injury and Illness Classification System (OIICS) 
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Based on the list of risk types identified in Table 6, specific risks related to 17 
construction occupations were estimated. Figure 11 shows proportions of risk types 
related to construction trade workers (47-2000), reinforcing iron and rebar workers (47-
2170), and roofers (47-2180). Numbers in parenthesis indicate total numbers of fatalities 
and days away injuries within the selected occupations. Proportions of risk types for the 




Figure 11: Proportions of 1
st
 level risk types by selected occupations 
As shown in two pie charts at the top of Figure 11, construction trade workers 
(47-2000) had different proportions of risk types in two injury severities. Regarding days 
away injury of construction trade workers, ‘Contact with objects and equipment’ (E6) 
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was the most frequent risk type representing 36.65%, and followed by ‘Overexertion and 
bodily reaction’ (E7) and ‘Falls, slips, trips’ (E4) representing 30.15% and 25.72%, 
respectively. In terms of fatality, ‘Falls, slips, trips’ (E4) was the dominant risk type with 
42.8%, followed by ‘Transportation incidents’ (E2), ‘Contact with object and equipment’ 
(H6), ‘Exposure to harmful substances or environments’ (E5). Also, when proportions of 
three different construction trades were compared, they have different risk types by 
occupation types.  
The 2nd level risk types were also analyzed. Figure 12 represents detailed risk 
types of ‘reinforcing iron and rebar workers’ (47-2170) and ‘roofers’ (47-2180) 
comparing to ‘construction trade workers’ (47-2000). In this figure, the x-axis indicates 
2nd level risk types and the y-axis shows RDAIR. In addition, values in parenthesis next 
to each occupation indicate their overall RDAIR, and a height of bar indicates a RDAIR 
of a selected risk type of a selected occupation. RFA and RDAIR analyses of the 2
nd
 level 
risk types for all occupations can be found in Appendix C. 
 
 
Figure 12: RDAIR of 2
nd
 level risk types by selected occupations 
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As shown in Figure 12, ‘Struck by object or equipment’ (E62) was the most 
frequent days away injury type in the construction industry while ‘Overexertion 
involving outside sources’ (E71) and ‘Falls to lower level’ (E43) were the most frequent 
injury types for ‘reinforcing iron and rebar workers’ (47-2170) and ‘roofers’ (47-2180), 
respectively. Also, from the comparison of the same risk types by different occupations, 
relative magnitude of injury frequency of an occupation was also examined. 
From the specific risk analysis, it was found that different occupations were 
exposed to different types of risks. In addition, even the same occupation, workers 
experienced different risks by fatality and days away injury. Therefore, it is important to 
understand the dynamic nature of inherent safety risk types by occupations and injury 
severity to prepare safety actions effectively. 
3.4.3 Specific Sources of Injury by Occupations 
The objective of identifying and quantifying sources of injuries is to explain the 
causes of potential injuries. Out of nine 1st level and 78 2nd level sources identified from 
the OIICS, all of 1st level and 50 2nd level sources were related to either fatality or days 
away injury within construction trade workers in 2013. In this analysis, nine 1st level and 
32 2nd level sources were finally selected by discarding sources representing lower than 
1.0% of RFR and RDAIR. Table 7 summarizes final specific sources of injuries related to 













Code Title Code Title 




S2 CONTAINERS, FURNITURE 
AND FIXTURES 
S21 Containers 
S22 Furniture and fixtures 
 
S3 MACHINERY S32 Construction, logging, and mining machinery 
S33 Heating, cooling, and cleaning machinery and 
appliances 
S34 Material and personnel handling machinery 
S35 Metal, woodworking, and special material machinery 
S37 Special process machinery 
S39 Miscellaneous machinery 
 
S4 PARTS AND MATERIALS S41 Building materials—solid elements 
S42 Fasteners, connectors, ropes, ties 
S44 Machine, tool, and electric parts 
S46 Tars, sealants, caulking, insulating material 
 
S5 PERSONS, PLANTS, 
ANIMALS, AND MINERALS 
S55 Nonmetallic minerals, except fuel 
S56 Person—injured or ill worker 
S57 Person—other than injured or ill worker 
S58 Plants, trees, vegetation—not processed 
 
S6 STRUCTURES AND 
SURFACES 
S61 Confined spaces 
S62 Buildings—office, plant, residential 
S63 Structures other than buildings 
S65 Other structural elements 
S66 Floors, walkways, ground surfaces 
 
S7 TOOLS, INSTRUMENTS, AND 
EQUIPMENT 
S70 Tools, instruments, and equipment, unspecified 
S71 Handtools—nonpowered 
S72 Handtools—powered 
S73 Handtools—power not determined 
S74 Ladders 
S79 Other tools, instruments, and equipment 
 
S8 VEHICLES S84 Highway vehicles, motorized 
S86 Off-road and industrial vehicles—powered 
S87 Plant and industrial vehicles—nonpowered 
 
S9 OTHER SOURCES S92 Environmental and elemental conditions 
S94 Scrap, waste, debris 
 
 Source: Occupational Injury and Illness Classification System (OIICS) 
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Based on the list of sources identified in Table 7, RFR and RDAIR of specific 
sources of injuries related to 17 construction occupations were estimated. Figure 13 
shows proportions of primary sources of injuries related to construction trade workers 
(47-2000), reinforcing iron and rebar workers (47-2170), and roofers (47-2180). Numbers 
in parenthesis indicate total numbers of fatalities and days away injuries within the 





Figure 13: Proportions of 1
st
 level primary sources by selected occupations 
Similarly to proportions of specific risk types represented in Figure 11, primary 
sources of injuries vary by occupation types and injury severity types. As shown in 
Figure 13, ‘Parts and Materials’ (S4), ‘Structures and surfaces’ (S6), and ‘Tools, 
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instruments, and Equipment’ (S7) are the top three primary sources of fatalities indicating 
17.2%, 17.2%, and 16.0%, respectively, within the construction trade workers (47-2000). 
‘Structures and surfaces’ (S6), ‘Vehicles’ (S8), and ‘Tools, instruments, and Equipment’ 
(S7) are main sources representing 36.2%, 19.0%, and 12.7% of days away injuries, 
respectively. For roofers (47-2180), ‘Structures and surfaces’ (S6) is the most frequent 
sources of two injury severity types, but their proportions and diversity of sources are 
quite different. 
The 2nd level sources of injury were also analyzed for fatality and days away 
injury by 17 different construction occupations. Figure 14 represents detailed primary 
sources of day away injuries for ‘reinforcing iron and rebar workers’ (47-2170) and 
‘roofers’ (47-2180) comparing to ‘construction trade workers’ (47-2000). In this figure, 
the x-axis indicates 2nd level sources and the y-axis shows RDAIR. In addition, values in 
parenthesis next to each occupation indicate their overall RDAIR, and a height of bar 
indicates a RDAIR of a selected primary source of a selected occupation. RFA and 
RDAIR analyzes of the 2
nd





Figure 14: RDAIR of 2nd level primary sources by selected occupations 
As shown in Figure 14, ‘Building materials-solid elements’ (S41) was the most 
frequent primary source of days away injury for construction trade workers (47-2000) 
and reinforcing iron and rebar workers (47-2170) while ‘Other structural elements’ (S65) 
which includes roofs was the most frequent sources of days away injury for roofers (47-
2180).  
Primary sources of injury analysis showed that different sources contributed to 
injuries of different occupations. In addition, even within the same occupation, workers 
were injured by different sources depending on injury severity types. Therefore, it is 
important to understand the dynamic sources of injury by occupations and injury 
severities to prepare safety actions effectively. 
3.4.4 Specific Risk Scenarios by Occupations 
In Figure 12, ‘Struck by object or equipment’ (E62) was identified as the most 
frequent risk type of days away injury, and in Figure 14, ‘Building materials-solid 
elements’ (S41) was identified as the most frequent primary source of days away injury. 
However, it is hard to say that ‘Struck by object or equipment’ (E62) was caused by only 
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‘Building materials-solid elements’ (S41) because risk types and sources have a many to 
many relationship. There might be other sources that led to ‘Struck by object or 
equipment’ (E62) such as ‘Handtools-nonpowered’ (E71) or ‘Scrap, waste, debris’ (S94). 
Also, it is possible that ‘Building materials-solid elements’ (S41) resulted in multiple risk 
types such as ‘Overexertion and bodily reaction’ (E7) as well as ‘Struck by object or 
equipment’ (E62). The objective of analyzing risk scenarios is to identify many to many 
relationships between primary sources and specific risk types, and understand various 
risk scenarios by different occupations. 
Data about the relationship between primary sources of days away injury by 17 
construction occupations was obtained from the BLS SOII, but equivalent data related to 
fatality was only available for only overall US industries from the BLS CFOI. However, 
the overall US industrial data cannot capture the unique nature of the construction 
industry. For example, ‘Construction, logging, and mining machinery’ (S32) is one of the 
main primary sources of fatalities in the construction industry, especially for 
‘Construction Equipment Operators’ (47-2070), but this source is regarded as a minor 
source of overall industrial fatalities. Since the disproportion of primary sources of 
fatalities between overall industries and the construction industry, possible fatality 
scenarios and their magnitudes were not considered in this analysis. Figure 15 illustrates 
days away injury risk scenarios of construction trade workers (47-2000). 
 
 
Figure 15: Days away injury risk scenarios of construction trade workers (47-2000) 
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As can be seen Figure 15, the relationship between primary sources of days away 
injuries and specific risk types is complicated. For days away injuries, ‘Falls on same 
level due to floors, walkways, ground surfaces’ (S66-E42), ‘Other exertions or bodily 
reactions due to person-injured or ill workers (S56-E73), and ‘Falls to lower level due to 
ladders’ (S74-E43) are the top three most frequent injury scenarios representing 7.68%, 
7.13%, and 6.72% of days away injuries, respectively. E62 which was identified the most 
frequent risk type of days away injuries was caused by 14 different sources out of 17 
sources, and S41 which was examined as one of the most critical sources of days away 
injuries which resulted in six different risk types. 
3.4.5 Final Risk Quantification Model 
The purpose of the risk quantification model is to quantitatively explain why and 
how much a construction worker will be in danger based on historical accident data. In 
the proposed model, overall and specific risk, sources of risk, and risk scenario estimated 
from previous sections were integrated into a single data structure by each construction 
occupation based on the data hierarchy presented in Figure 8. Figure 16 illustrates the 
final risk quantification model of construction trade workers (47-2000). Final risk 




Figure 16: Risk quantification model of construction trade workers (47-2000) 
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In Figure 16, the code in the middle indicates occupation type, the upper part of 
the code is about fatality related data, and the lower part explains days away injury 
related data for the selected occupation. The overall safety risk of the occupation was 
calculated by summating RFR and RDAIR of the occupation and each relative injury rate 
was decomposed into hazard types and sources of injuries. Ex (1st level risk type) and 
Exx (2nd level risk type) explain relative frequency of risk types an occupation was 
exposed to. Sxx represents 2nd level primary sources of fatalities (top) and days away 
injuries (bottom), and links between Sxx and Exx indicate cause and effect relationship 
between sources and hazards representing injury scenarios. In the model, the sum of the 
lower levels does not equal to a RFR or RDAIR of the higher level because there were 
missing data and only risk types and sources of injuries with more than 1% of RFR and 
RDAIR were represented. Table 8 summarizes data representatives by hierarchical levels. 
Data representatives for all occupations also can be found in Appendix F. 
Table 8: Summary of Data Representative by Hierarchical Level 
 Total 1st level risk 
(Ex) 
2nd level risk 
(Exx) 
2nd level source 
(Sxx) 
2nd level risk 
scenario 
RFR 100.00 99.65 94.78 75.83 N/A 
RDAIR 100.00 98.74 92.40 71.51 66.87 
As can be seen Figure 16, the overall safety risk of construction trade workers 




 hazard type of days away injuries are 
‘Contact with objects and equipment’ (E6) and ‘Struck by objects and equipment’ (E62) 
representing 34.65 and 20.97 out of 100.00. The most common source of days away 
injuries is ‘Building materials’ (S41) indicating 11.55. Also, the most common days away 
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injury scenario is ‘Falls on same level due to Floors and ground surface’ (E42-S66) 
representing 6.45 out of 100.00.  
Using the model, we can understand common hazard types, sources of injury, and 
injury scenarios by different occupations. The findings show that every occupation has a 
unique pattern of safety data structure in terms of hazards and sources of injuries and, 
thus, this is a good justification of why safety risk should be analyzed by different 
occupations. 
3.5 APPLICATIONS 
Two relative injury indicators estimated by different hierarchical levels in this 
chapter can be used by managers including project managers, safety managers, site 
managers, or superintendents to mitigate the expected safety risk in different ways. A 
construction project typically involves numerous workers and resources. If safety risk 
levels could be reliably estimated by occupations, risk types, and sources, strategic safety 
plan could be established such as inspections and training on high-risk occupations. For 
example, relative injury rate data of selected risk type by different occupations enable the 
preparation of a safety plan or more effective training by focusing on high-risk 
occupations. Figure 17 shows relative fatality rate (RFR) of ‘Fall to lower level’ (E43) by 
different construction occupations. 
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Figure 17: RFR of ‘Fall to lower level’ (E43) by different construction trades 
As shown in Figure 17, safety mangers have to mainly consider roofers (47-2180) 
when they prepare a safety plan or training related to ‘Fall to lower level’ (E43). In a 
similar manner, safety materials related to specific sources or risk scenarios also can be 
prepared using relative injury rates data of selected sources of injury or risk scenarios. 
3.6 CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter presents an innovative safety risk quantification model to assess 
safety risk of different construction occupations. Based on two national safety databases, 
the BLS CFOI and SOII, historical accidents in 2013 were quantitatively analyzed to 
understand specific risk types, sources of injury, and risk scenarios associated with two 
different injury severities, fatality and days away injury, by 17 different construction 
occupations as well as overall construction trade workers. 
Unlike earlier studies using qualitative inputs from experts or observational inputs 
from case studies, the proposed model used overall construction industry accident data to 






































































































































E43: Fall to lower level (41.2%) 
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attributes which are risk types and primary sources of injury to explain common accident 
scenarios by different construction occupations.  
If safety risks are predictable, they may be prevented. Therefore, knowing the 
dynamic value of risk can potentially aid safety managers as well as project managers to 
identify the high-risk occupations or activities in advance and would enable them to 
prepare and allocate limited safety resources in a more efficient manner. As Apostolakis 
(2004) pointed out, any risk quantification model is not perfect, yet the proposed risk 
quantification model is expected to help upper level project managers in safety decision 
making to minimize safety risks in a project. Due to the limited data, the proposed risk 
quantification model analyzed only two types of low frequency and high impact accidents 
data. Future studies should integrate high frequency and low impact safety data such as 
near-misses to further expand the analyses. 
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Chapter 4 4D Construction Safety Planning: Site-specific Temporal and 
Spatial Information Integration 
This chapter presents a formalized 4-dimensional (4D) construction safety 
planning process that addresses site-specific temporal and spatial safety information. The 
safety data, which includes activity risk, site-specific temporal and spatial information, 
will be integrated from the results of Chapter 3, a project schedule, and a 3D model, 
respectively. The proposed safety planning approach can provide safety personnel with a 
site-specific proactive safety planning tool that can be used to better manage jobsite 
safety. In addition, visual safety materials can also aid in training workers on safety and, 
consequently, being able to identify site-specific hazards and respond to them more 
effectively. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Construction remains one of most hazardous industry especially due to the 
dynamic nature of work environments (Bobick 2004). According to the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, in 2013, 828 construction workers were killed, which represents 18.1% of fatal 
work injuries in the United States (BLS 2013). 828 fatalities indicate that the fatal work 
injury rate is 9.7 for every 100,000 full-time equivalent construction workers, and United 
States (US) construction workers are approximately 2.94 times more likely to be killed 
compared to the average fatal work injury rate for all industries, which is 3.3.  
Since the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 was established, which 
places the responsibility of construction safety on the employer, fatality and disabling 
rate in the construction industry has dramatically decreased. After this federal law came 
into effect, various injury prevention strategies have been developed and resulted in a 
significant improvement of safety management in the construction industry (Esmaeili and 
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Hallowell 2011). However, during the last decade, construction safety improvement has 
decelerated and fatality rate in the construction industry is still much higher than other 
industries (BLS 2013). As a result, innovative injury prevention practices such as 
integration of project schedules and information technology have been introduced to 
improve current construction safety management practices. 
Construction safety management activities are typically categorized into safety 
planning and execution processes. The main tasks of safety planning include hazard 
identification, risk assessment, and preparing safety controls based on regulations, 
company safety policies, and previous experience. Safety execution process includes 
safety meetings/training, safety monitoring, and audits. As identified in Chapter 1.2.2, 
despite the interdependent relationship between safety planning and execution processes, 
current safety planning practices lack a systematic approach to effectively identify and 
manage hazards prior to construction because of limited safety tools and the dynamic 
nature of construction. Also, current safety planning activities lack site-specific 
information and, when general safety plans are used as safety materials, safety 
meetings/trainings are less effective and result in workers not being able to identify site-
specific hazards and respond to them effectively. Due to ineffective safety planning, 
safety planning and execution processes are generally segregated and, consequently, most 
safety execution processes rely on ad-hoc safety activities during construction. Given that 
the majority of hazards are generated from specific site conditions and activities in 
construction work zones, developing site-specific safety plans is fundamental in order to 
improve the safety execution process and, consequently, site-specific safety management 
at the jobsite. 
To address the safety issues related to the dynamic nature of the construction 
industry, Yi and Langford (2006) emphasize the importance of integration between safety 
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management and scheduling. Hazardous situations vary according to different project 
progress and the schedule should be considered for safety planning (Yi and Langford 
2006). However, current safety planning approaches do not consider frequent updates of 
a project schedule to address dynamic changes of expected hazards and safety controls. In 
order to create more effective site-specific safety plans, it is important to integrate safety 
plans and project schedules. 
Another challenge of site-specific safety planning is lack of safety sources 
utilized. While information technology-based approaches, such as Building Information 
Modeling (BIM), have been widely used for project planning and progress monitoring, 
construction safety planning is still highly dependent on traditional sources such as 2D 
drawings, paper-based regulations, and tacit information. As a result, current safety 
planning approaches limit the capability to identify and analyze hazards prior to 
construction and can potentially be improved by leveraging information technology. 
This chapter proposes a formalized framework for construction safety planning 
through a 4-dimemsional (4D) environment, which integrates 3D and time, to address 
site-specific temporal and spatial safety information. The proposed safety planning 
approach includes: (1) activity safety quantification, (2) safety schedule, and (3) safety 
4D simulation. 
4.2 BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
4.2.1 Risk Analysis 
One of main purposes of safety planning is to predict risky activities to prepare or 
mitigate risks in advance. Risk analysis is a systematic process to analyze systems by 
identifying and evaluating safety characteristics (Harms-Ringdahl 2004). In the 
construction industry, safety risk analysis studies can be classified into four areas: 
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project-, trade-, or activity-, attribute-, or worker-based risk analysis. Sun et al. (2008) 
assessed the risky level of Beijing Olympic venues’ construction projects, and Baradan 
and Usmen (2006) compared riskiness of 16 construction trades. Project- and trade-based 
risk analyses enable the comparison of high level safety risk, but are difficult to be 
integrated with a project schedule which typically includes activity-based information. 
There have been several studies to analyze safety risk at an activity level. For example, 
Everett (1999) quantified construction ergonomic risks for 65 construction activities by 
using ordinal scoring system (1-3) obtained from expert judgement. Jannadi and 
Almishari (2003) developed a risk assessor model (RAM) to estimate activity safety 
scores using a function of severity, exposure, and probability, which was determined by 
end-users. Lee and Halpin (2003) identified three critical risk factors (preplanning, 
training, and supervision) and applied a fuzzy logic model to predict riskiness of 
activities related to utility-trenching process. To minimize biases inherent in a survey 
approach, Hallowell and Gambatese (2009) quantified safety scores of 13 activities by 
considering the average of severity and frequency obtained from Delphi method. The 
activity-based risks analysis can be integrated with a project schedule, but it is 
impractical and time-consuming to analyze safety scores of all construction activities 
using current approaches (Esmaeili et al. 2015a). Esmaeili et al. (2015b) identified and 
quantified safety scores of measurable attributes for struck-by hazards in the construction 
industry. According to this attribute-based risk analysis, safety scores of any activities 
can be quantified from the combination of predefined attributes and enables one to 
address the dynamic nature of a construction activity with safety attributes being selected 
by users depending on the work environment of an activity. In Chapter 3, I quantified 
dynamic safety risk of a worker by occupation types and predictable sources of injury. I 
developed safety risk quantification models for 17 different construction occupations and 
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emphasized how differently the same sources of injury could impact on safety risk of a 
worker by occupation types.   
Literature shows that current activity-based risk approaches have extensibility 
issues to be integrated with a project schedule and cannot address the dynamic nature of 
construction work environments. Current attribute- and worker-based risk quantification 
approaches can address the dynamic nature of the construction industry and be extended 
to estimate risks of any activities. In this chapter, the worker-based risk analysis approach 
developed in Chapter 3 was adapted to estimated activity risk. 
4.2.2 Construction Safety and Schedule Integration 
Construction projects are dynamic in nature (Bobick 2004); unique factors include 
frequent work team rotation, weather, changes in topography, and different concurrent 
activities including various combination of workers and equipment (Rozenfeld et al. 
2010). Due to the dynamic characteristics of construction sites, the construction schedule 
gained attention when combined with safety planning. Two main safety sources, safety 
regulations and risk data, have been integrated with a project schedule. Kartam (1997) 
attempted to integrate the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) 
regulations into schedules. Cagno et al. (2001) and Saurin et al. (2004) attempted to link 
construction activities in the schedule with safety control measures prepared by safety 
experts. The main objective of integrating safety risk data into project schedules is to 
identify high risk work periods and minimize possible risks in the identified periods prior 
to the start of the activities. Akinci et al. (2002) showed the possibility of automatically 
detecting and avoiding hazardous situations by integrating the project schedule into her 
time-space conflict analysis tool. Wang et al. (2006) attempted to identify high risk 
periods by integrating activities and expected injury cost data in a simulation-based 
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model (SimSAFE). Yi and Langford (2006) stated that hazardous situations vary 
according to different project progress and the schedule should be considered. To address 
this issue, Yi and Langford (2006) attempted to predict when and where risky situations 
would occur by combining historical accident sources. Navon and Kolton (2006) 
introduced an automated safety monitoring and control model to identify fall hazards and 
possible locations. Hallowell et al. (2011) considered task interaction risks and suggested 
an integrated model of safety risk data into project schedules. Later, Esmaeili and 
Hallowell (2012) developed a more practical integration model by identifying common 
highway construction work tasks and quantifying risks of tasks in the schedule. There are 
also several attempts to integrate safety and schedule using different types of information 
technology, discussed subsequently. 
Previous studies emphasized the importance of safety and schedule integration to 
address when and where hazards are expected using third party applications. However, 
there are few studies addressing how safety knowledge is dynamically updated as a 
project schedule is updated. Since a project schedule is frequently updated, this study will 
focus on the dynamic linkage of safety risk data and schedule integration. 
4.2.3 Construction Safety and Information Technology 
According to Esmaeili and Hallowell (2012), the construction industry is 
saturated by safety innovations and new injury prevention practices, such as integrating 
information technologies to construction safety, need to be introduced to improve 
construction safety. Since traditional 2D drawings and paper-based sources for safety 
planning limit the capability to identify and analyze hazards prior to construction, 
information technology-based approaches, such as Building Information Modeling 
(BIM), Geographic Information System (GIS), Augmented Reality (AR), and Sensing 
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and Warning Technologies, have been widely studied. In the Architecture, Engineering 
and Construction (AEC) industry, BIM has been widely used for project planning, 
designing, scheduling, and estimating. Related to safety, BIM has been studied in two 
main aspects, 4D visualization and application of rule sets. Using 4D visualization 
enhances the detection of spatial conflict or congestion prior to construction (Leite et al. 
2011; Mallasi and Dawood 2004). In addition, 4D simulation can overcome the problem 
due to the conventional safety planning practice using 2D drawings and helps safety 
personnel detect and analyze hazards effectively (Chantawit et al. 2005). A series of 
studies (Rozenfeld et al. 2009; Rozenfeld et al. 2010; Sacks et al. 2009) developed a 
spatial and temporal safety/schedule integration model in a 4D environment. Their 
preconstruction safety planning tool considered task interaction risk factors and used 
user-provided semi-automated data to analyze hazardous activities in a 4D simulation. 
Another attempt of BIM for safety is applying safety rule checking system to 
automatically detect hazards and generate corresponding safety measures (Benjaoran and 
Bhokha 2010; Zhang et al. 2013).  
GIS for safety planning emphasizes that topography information can play an 
important role to prevent construction site accidents (Isikdag et al. 2008). Bansal (2011) 
integrated 4D modeling and geospatial data for construction safety in the GIS 
environment to predict potential hazardous places and activities.  
Virtual reality (VR) has been mainly used for site safety training purposes with 
other visualization technologies. Hadikusumo and Rowlinson (2002) developed a design-
for-safety-process (DFSP) tool to identify safety hazards generated during the design 
phase by integrating a virtual construction environment and a safety database. The 
Construction Industry Institute Research Team 293 (CII 2013) introduced the System for 
Augmented Virtuality Environment Safety (SAVES) to educate construction workers. 
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According the results, there was a 27% improvement in terms of hazard identification 
from workers trained in the VR environment.  
Sensing and Warning Technologies have been applied to avoid jobsite collisions 
involved with heavy construction equipment, such as tower cranes or dump trucks. Choe 
et al. (2014) evaluated the reliability of radar- and ultrasonic-based collision warning 
systems to minimize blind area around pickup and dump trucks. Tag-based wireless radio 
frequency identification (RFID) systems have been actively applied for the autonomous 
real-time jobsite monitoring to generate warnings on hazardous zones by detecting and 
tracking materials or workers on foot (Maalek and Sadeghpour 2013; Naticchia et al. 
2013). 
The literature shows that proactive safety mitigation practices are necessary to 
enhance construction site safety from project planning to construction execution phases. 
In addition, previous studies have indicated that information technology can overcome 
limitations in the traditional safety planning approach. 
 4.3 RESEARCH METHOD 
Even though all safety practices are important and interrelated, this chapter 
focuses on improving the safety risk analysis process in pre-project safety planning. This 
proposed safety risk analysis framework considers the macro level of predictable 
dynamic contexts of project such as activity and updates to construction documents, 
especially project schedules, rather than dynamic changes of micro level work situations 
such as uncertainties of workers, equipment path, weather, or activity delays which 
cannot be predicted in the early stages of a project. Micro level uncertainties should be 
considered in the short-term based planning as well as the field of real-time jobsite 
monitoring and may be integrated with the macro level safety planning process. In 
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addition, the proposed framework identified risky activity, risky work periods, and risky 
work zones, but specific risk controls were not be provided because the main objective of 
the proposed framework is to help safety experts prepare safety controls more 
systematically and effectively. 
Motivated by challenges and limitations of current safety planning approaches 
and previous research efforts to improve construction safety management using 
information technology, this research aims to systematically formalize the safety 
planning process through a 4-dimensional (4D) environment, which integrates 3D and 
time, to address site-specific temporal and spatial safety information. The proposed risk 
assessment approach includes: (1) activity safety quantification, and (2) temporal 
information integration (safety schedule), and spatial information integration (safety 4D 
simulation). Figure 18 illustrates the general process of this chapter. 
 
  
Figure 18: Three-phase general research process 
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As shown in Figure 18, activity safety was estimated from historical accident data 
(Chapter 3) and contexts of each activity. From the integration of activity safety data and 
project schedule, a safety schedule was generated to predict risky work period. Lastly, a 
safety 4D simulation was created by linking the safety schedule and a project 3D model 
to analyze risky work zones. Details of each process are presented in the subsequent 
sections. 
4.3.1 Activity Safety Quantification 
The main purpose of safety risk assessment is to estimate safety riskness of 
expected activities in a quantitative manner and to assist safety managers in 
understanding why they are dangerous prior to construction. From the quantitative safety 
values, risky activities can be prioritized and appropriate safety actions can be prepared 
when causes of riskiness are identified. In Chapter 3, individual worker’s safety risk was 
quantified by different construction occupations and explained why they are risky based 
on a list of measurable activity information which can be used as a reference. However, 
due to the information availability at the time of analysis, activity safety can be estimated 
with four different scenarios as shown in Figure 19. 
 
Figure 19: Four different activity safety quantification scenarios 
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As shown in Figure 19, the essential information of activity safety quantification 
is occupation type. Once occupation types are identified, the average or cumulative safety 
scores can be estimated based on whether the number of workers within an activity is 
available. In addition, depending on the availability of specific activity information such 
as resource or location of work, specific or general causes of activity safety can be 
identified. Among four activity safety quantification scenarios, the first one (i.e. sum of 
risks for all workers with specific causes) might be the most reliable and the last 
approach (i.e. average risk with general causes) might be the least reliable. In this study, a 
list of construction occupation types and measurable activity contexts for safety 
quantification were adapted from the findings in Chapter 3. 
4.3.2 Temporal Information Integration: safety schedule 
As projects become more complex and schedule pressure increases, it has become 
common that multiple activities are planned at the same time. It is, thus, important to 
predict high risky work periods and prepare safety resources in advance. In activity safety 
analysis, safety score of a single activity is analyzed, while safety score of multiple 
activities can be analyzed by integrating project temporal information which can be 
extracted from a schedule. In this study, daily safety score was calculated by summing 
safety scores of all activities performed in a single day. The following equation shows 
how to calculate risk of a specific day. 
 
𝑺𝒂𝒇𝒆𝒕𝒚 𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝑫𝒂𝒚 𝒊 = ∑ 𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝑺𝒂𝒇𝒆𝒕𝒚 𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆𝒏𝒋=𝟎  𝐢𝐣 (1) 
In which safety score of day i denotes a total safety score of day i and activity 
safety score ij indicates safety score of activity j planned at day i. 
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One of challenges of integrating activity safety score with a project schedule is 
frequent updates of project schedules. Therefore, work period safety score needs to be 
dynamically linked with a schedule to address the dynamic nature of a construction 
schedule. To address this challenge, activity safety score is added as a property of the 
activity in a schedule. As a result, safety scores are linked to activities in a schedule, and 
work period safety score can be estimated and updated automatically as the schedule is 
updated. Estimated risky work periods will be presented in a graph-based format and, 
thus, intuitively allow safety personnel to prepare safety resources ahead of time. 
4.3.3 Spatial Information Integration: safety 4D simulation 
According to Leite et al. (In Review), BIM has not yet been widely used for 
construction safety planning even though BIM is broadly used for productivity and 
progress monitoring. Construction safety still relies on traditional 2D drawings and 
paper-based sources which limits the potential capability to identify and analyze hazards 
prior to construction. In this research, 4D safety BIM, which integrates a safety schedule 
and a project 3D model, will be utilized to identify concurrent activities and predict risky 
work zones. 
The main difference of the proposed safety 4D simulation from previous studies 
(Akinci et al. 2002; Sacks et al. 2009) which used existing model elements to analyze 
activity safety is utilizing virtual work zones to identify concurrent activities and to 
visualize work zone riskiness rather than utilizing actual 3D model elements. The 
expected advantages of using the work zone concept are: 1) safety information can be 
independently visualized from the original project progress information which is 
visualized on 3D model elements, and 2) activities which do not match the 3D model 
elements can be analyzed. From the use of virtual work zones linked with activities in the 
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safety schedule, I aimed at designing dynamic work zone safety analysis which can be 
extensible to any activities and amplify a synergy with the original purpose of 4D 
simulation, project progress visualization. 
The safety score of an activity can be affected by concurrent activities due to the 
temporal and spatial contexts of a project. Simple summation of activities’ safety scores 
cannot fully address the safety impacts of concurrent activities because this approach 
does not consider dangers caused by other activities. For example, a survey activity might 
have little potential hazard of struck-by equipment. However, if an excavation activity is 
scheduled at the same time and zone as a survey activity, surveyors will be exposed to the 
potential hazard of being struck by an excavator or a dump truck. Therefore it is 
important to predict and identify concurrent activities in advance. In this research, a list 
of concurrent activities will be identified in the safety 4D simulation when multiple 
activities share the same work zone rather than quantifying amplified safety score of 
concurrent activities. With an identified list of concurrent activities which is also 
dynamically linked with a schedule update, safety personnel can provide proactive safety 
trainings for workers at the jobsite. After identifying concurrent activities, work zone 
safety score will be calculated as follows: 
 
𝑺𝒂𝒇𝒆𝒕𝒚 𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒐𝒇 𝒁𝒐𝒏𝒆 𝒌𝒊 = ∑ 𝑨𝒄𝒕𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕𝒚 𝑺𝒂𝒇𝒆𝒕𝒚 𝑺𝒄𝒐𝒓𝒆 𝒌𝒊𝒋𝒏𝒊=𝟎  (2) 
In which safety score of zone ki denotes a total safety score of zone k at day i and 
activity safety score kij indicates safety score of activity j planned at day i within zone k. 
4.4 CASE STUDY 
The purpose of the case study was to validate the proposed safety analysis 
approach and examine potential benefits and barriers by applying it to an actual 
construction project. The project B is a typical office building project located in the 
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downtown area of a major city in Southern United States. The original plan was to start 
the project from March 2015, but it was initiated from August 2015 due to the owner’s 
decision. The expected completion of the new plan is July 2017. This project consists of 
an underground parking garage and an office building, and the general contractor is the 
same company introduced in the motivating case in Chapter 1.1.2. As mentioned in the 
motivating case, this general contractor actively implements Building Information 
Modeling (BIM) for all their projects and has shown above average safety performance in 
the past. This project is an excellent candidate to test the proposed safety planning in 
following reasons: 
 Due to the delay of the project initiation, the construction schedule is tighter than 
the original plan. There will be higher possibilities of multiple activities planned 
simultaneously which might increase safety risk of the jobsite. 
 The project is located in a major urban area. As other typical downtown 
construction projects experienced, construction space is limited and the vicinity of 
the project is expected to be crowded. In addition, due to the focused public 
attention, when an undesired event such as an accident occurs in the jobsite, 
serious damage of the company’s reputation is expected. 
 The project has a zoning plan to manage their self-performing structural frame 
works including all formwork, rebar installation, and concrete placement. 
Therefore, work zone-based safety analysis can be available. 
 A comprehensive project schedule, 3D and 4D models are available at the time of 
the case study. 
Three rounds of meetings were held at the general contractor’s office to share 
ideas and ensure successful implementation. Table 9 summarizes the purpose, 
participants, and focus of meeting of each meeting. 
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Table 9: Summary of Meetings with the General Contractor 
 1st meeting 2nd meeting 3rd meeting 









Activity analysis I 
Safety schedule I 
Safety 4D I 
Activity analysis II 
Safety schedule II 
Safety 4D II 








Scope N/A Partial parking 
garage 
Partial parking garage 
Partial office building 
Notes N/A Representative 
occupation 
Detailed occupations and 
number of workers 
The initial meeting was held to share the general idea of the proposed safety 
planning framework. The reasons for having the meeting with VDC managers are 
follows; 1) the VDC managers deals with multiple projects simultaneously and, thus, the 
optimal project can be selected and 2) the VDC managers have important project data 
which are essential to develop a testbed model. After the 1
st
 meeting, a VDC manager 
decided to share information of the project B since the reasons explained above, and the 
project B newly started which means having more potential to get benefits from the 
proposed safety planning than actively constructing projects. After the 1
st
 meeting, all 
necessary project data including the project schedule, zoning plan, 3D and 4D models 
were obtained, and safety analysis was conducted for the partial underground structural 
frame works. In addition, the project manager provided representative occupation types 
for all activities scheduled during the selected period. The reason for using representative 
occupation types for the analysis is that the project does not have a specific number of 
workers and resource information for each activity. 
In the second meeting, the initial activity safety analysis, safety schedule, and 
safety 4D simulation were reviewed with two VDC managers and the project manager. 
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The safety manager did not attend the meeting and the results were shared with the safety 
manager after the meeting. The period of safety analysis is from November 19, 2015 to 
December 31, 2015. During the period, six typical activities are repeated and Table 10 
summarizes the results of initial activity safety score analysis. 






Hazard types Sources of injuries 
FRP Vertical Wall Carpenter 196 E43  48.44 24.7% S65 22.81 11.6% 
E62  30.42 15.5% S74 21.13 10.8% 
E71  24.77 12.6% S66  15.48 7.9% 
SOG Laborer 308 E43  65.00 21.1% S84  30.06 9.8% 
E62  60.44 19.6% S65  23.79 7.7% 
E71  15.48 5.0% S41  20.56 6.7% 
FRP Column Carpenter 196 E43  48.44 24.7% S65  22.81 11.6% 
E62  30.42 15.5% S74  21.13 10.8% 
E71 24.77 12.6% S66  15.48 7.9% 
Place Concrete Laborer 308 E43  65.00 21.1% S84  30.06 9.8% 
E62 60.44 19.6% S65  23.79 7.7% 
E71 15.48 5.0% S41  20.56 6.7% 
Form Deck Carpenter 196 E43 48.44 24.7% S65  22.81 11.6% 
E62 30.42 15.5% S74  21.13 10.8% 
E71 24.77 12.6% S66  15.48 7.9% 
Rebar/MEP Slab Rebar workers 166 E71 48.55 29.2% S41  41.61 25.1% 
E42  31.21 18.8% S66 31.21 18.8% 
E62 10.4 6.3% S56  24.28 14.6% 
In this analysis, safety score of an activity, hazard types, and sources of injuries 
are equivalent to the representative worker’s occupation type. For example, Fiber-
Reinforced Plastic (FRP) vertical wall has 196 safety score which is equal to safety risk 
of carpenter. The details of the activity safety analysis dividing results into fatality and 
days away injury can be found in Appendix G. 
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The next step is integrating a project schedule and activity safety scores to predict 
safety score profile throughout the selected project period. In order to update safety score 
profile automatically as the project changes, safety score of an activity was added as 
property of the activity in the schedule. During the observed period, 42 activities in total, 
including upper level activities, were planned on partial basements 2 and 3. Based on 
equation (1) presented in Chapter 4.3.2, daily safety score was estimated by summating 
safety scores of all activities planned at the same day. Figure 20 shows safety score 
profile between November 19 and December 31, 2015.  
 
 
Figure 20: Initial work period safety analysis for the parking garage 
In this figure, the x-axis represents amount of safety score and the y-axis indicates 
calendar days. Safety scores for all weekends and holidays were assumed having non-risk 
since no activity was planned during those days. In the initial work period analysis, 
December 21th was identified as the most dangerous day indicating a total safety score of 
1,454. This safety score profile enables providing an overall trend of safety score 
 83 
fluctuation throughout a project, but still cannot explain why certain days are dangerous. 
Therefore, additional analysis was conducted to explain common hazard types and 
sources of injuries. Table 11 summarizes specific safety analysis on December 21th. 
More analyses can be found in Appendix G. 
Table 11: Summary of Initial Safety Analysis on December 21th 
 
As described in Table 11, December 21th has seven activities planned at the same 
day. Also, common hazard types and sources of injuries were computed based on data 
shown in Table 10. For example, ‘Falls to lower level’ (E43) and ‘Other structural 
elements’ (S65) are the most possible hazard type and source of injuries representing 
21.1% and 9.9%, respectively, out of 1,454. 
In the work period safety analysis, December 21th has seven activities planned at 
the same day which increases total safety score for that day. However, these seven 
activities can be either planned for the same work zone or in different work zones. 
Depending on the number of concurrent activities, practical safety level should be 
determined and different safety management controls should be required. To analyze 
safety riskiness by work zones, safety scores were allocated into a zone that an activity is 
planned for based on a zoning plan provided by the general contractor. Figure 21 shows 
the zoning plan for the parking garage.  
Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W7 196 E43 362.5 24.9% S65 143.43 9.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W6 196 E62 222.94 15.3% S41 133.92 9.2%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S1 196 E71 193.61 13.3% S74 124.44 8.6%
SOG Pour 2 308
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG3) 196
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level B2 Pour1 166
Form Deck Level B2 Pour 1 196 Representative 53.6% Representative 27.6%
Activities





Figure 21: Zoning plan for the parking garage 
During the selected period, 42 activities were planned in seven different work 
zones, six work zones for basement 3 and one work zone for basement 2. Figure 22 and 
Table 12 show overall safety score profile and specific analysis in Zone 1 of basement 3 
(B3_Zone1). Work zone analysis for the rest of work zones can be found in Appendix G. 
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Figure 22: Initial work zone safety analysis for B3_Zone1 
Table 12: Summary of Initial Safety Analysis on December 21th in B3_Zone1 
 
 
As shown in Figure 22 and Table 12, December 1
st
 is the most dangerous day of 
B3_Zone1 because five activities are planned simultaneously. In addition, ‘Falls to lower 
level’ (E43) and ‘Other structural elements’ (S65) were identified as the most critical 
hazard type and source of injuries indicating 29.3% and 11.6%, respectively. Using the 
results of work zone safety analysis, a safety 4D simulation was generated to visualize 
work zone safety scores. Figure 23 illustrates screen shots of the safety 4D simulation for 
selected dates. 
Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E1 196 E43 229.68 29.3% S65 91.24 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N4 196 E62 121.68 15.5% S74 84.52 10.8%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N3 196 E71 99.08 12.6% S63 66.84 8.5%








Figure 23: Examples of initial safety 4D simulation on the parking garage 
In the safety 4D simulation, work zone safety scores were classified and 
visualized with three colors: green for low riskiness, blue for medium, and red for high 
riskiness. The criteria for the three levels was determined by the author, but it can be 
easily modified by end users.  
During the 2
nd
 meeting, all participants agreed that the number of workers should 
be considered for activity safety analysis. Estimating activity safety score using a 
representative occupation type is not reliable since some different activities such as ‘FRP 
Vertical Wall’, ‘FRP Column’, and ‘Form Deck’ have the same safety scores, which is 
not practical. According to the project manager, they used to collect the number of 
workers’ information from subcontractors, but nowadays this data have not been 
collected since they have not seen practical value in doing so. All participants agreed that 
using the proposed safety analysis framework would be beneficial, especially when this 
process is integrated with their existing safety inspection system. Also, the project 
manager pointed out that the safety 4D simulation can identify simultaneous activities 
planned for upper levels, which have identical floor plans, such as B3_Zone1 and 
B2_Zone1, which increase potential safety risk related to falling object hazards. 
Based on feedback from the VDC managers and project manager, the activity 
safety analysis, safety schedule, and safety 4D simulation were updated. In the final 
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safety analyzes, the number of workers by occupations was provided by the project 
manager and the partial office building sector was also analyzed. During the third 
meeting, VDC manager A, the project manager, and the safety manager participated in 
the review of the final safety analyzes. 
For the parking garage, the same work period was analyzed as the initial analysis 
and Table 13 summarizes the final activity analysis. The details of the final activity safety 
analysis dividing results into fatality and days away injury can be found in Appendix I. 
Table 13: Summary of Final Activity Safety Analysis for Parking Garage 
 
Type Amount % Type Amount %
Carpenter 6 E43 864.32 19.6% S41 480.88 10.9%
Rodman 6 E62 683.48 15.5% S84 403.46 9.2%
Laborer 7 E71 591.83 13.4% S66 376.01 8.5%
Equipment Operator 1
Total 20 Representative 48.6% Representative 28.6%
Carpenter 4 E71 767.28 17.1% S41 472.42 10.5%
Rodman 6 E43 686.88 15.3% S56 335.94 7.5%
Laborer 6 E62 637.2 14.2% S84 335.88 7.5%
Concrete Finisher 12
Equipment Operator 2
Total 30 Representative 46.5% Representative 25.5%
Carpenter 2 E43 418.84 17.7% S41 278.58 11.8%
Rodman 4 E62 359.68 15.2% S84 212.17 9.0%
Laborer 4 E71 332.02 14.1% S66 211.8 9.0%
Equipment Operator 1
Total 11 Representative 47.0% Representative 29.7%
Carpenter 3 E43 1214.66 19.4% S84 757.58 12.1%
Laborer 16 E62 1093.62 17.5% S65 538.51 8.6%
Concrete Finisher 4 E71 498.03 8.0% S41 386.41 6.2%
Equipment Operator 1
Total 24 Representative 44.9% Representative 26.9%
Carpenter 16 E43 1174.62 26.9% S65 482.48 11.0%
Laborer 4 E71 864.87 19.8% S74 413.24 9.4%
E42 555.57 12.7% S84 411.32 9.4%
Total 20 Representative 59.3% Representative 29.9%
Rodman 15 E71 855.81 25.1% S41 693.46 20.3%
Electrician 3 E42 515.96 15.1% S66 526.19 15.4%
Plumber 2 E62 467.1 13.7% S56 416.41 12.2%

















Common Sources of InjuiresCommon Hazard Types
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As can be seen in Table 13, when the number of workers was determined, more 
practical activity safety analysis was available. Unlike the initial activity safety analysis, 
safety scores of all activities are different, and common hazard types and sources of 
injuries are diverse by activity types. In this analysis, ‘Place Concrete’ was identified as 
the most dangerous activity since a total of 24 workers, including 16 laborers, one of the 
most dangerous occupation type, were expected to participate in this activity. 
Figure 24 shows the final work period safety analysis for the parking garage 
which integrated the project schedule with updated activity safety information. 
 
 
Figure 24: Final work period safety analysis for the parking garage 
In the final work period safety analysis, December 21th was also identified as the 
most dangerous day having a total safety score of 27,850. Comparing the trend of initial 
work period analysis, the updated trend shows a similar safety score fluctuation as the 
initial safety trend before December 21th. This is because most activities prior to 
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December 21th are ‘FRP vertical walls’ constructions at different work zones, which 
resulted in similar trends between two analyses. However, after December 21th where 
different activity types are planned simultaneously, safety score fluctuations are quite 
different between two analyses. Table 14 summarizes specific safety analysis for 
December 21th. More analyses can be found in Appendix I. 
Table 14: Summary of Final Safety Analysis on December 21th 
 
As described in Table 14, December 21th shows a total safety score of 27,850 and 
has seven activities planned for that day. Also, ‘Falls to lower level’ (E43) and ‘Building 
materials—solid elements’ (S41) are the most possible hazard type and source of injuries 
representing 18.4% and 11.5%, respectively. Compared to the results of initial safety 
analysis on the same day, the top three hazard types are the same with slightly different 
probabilities, but the top three sources of injuries are quite different. 
Figure 25 and Table 15 show the final safety score profile for B3_Zone1 and 
specific analysis on the most dangerous day. Work zone analysis for the rest of work 
zones can be found in Appendix I. 
 
Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W7 4404 E43 5135.45 18.4% S41 3198.94 11.5%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W6 4404 E62 4242.9 15.2% S66 2501.46 9.0%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S1 4404 E71 4211.76 15.1% S84 2261.12 8.1%
SOG Pour 2 4493
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG3) 2362
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level B2 Pour1 3409
Form Deck Level B2 Pour 1 4374 48.8% 28.6%
Date
12/21/2015 27850






Figure 25: Final work zone safety analysis for B3_Zone1 
Table 15: Summary of Final Safety Analysis on December 21th in B3_Zone1 
 
As shown in Figure 25 and Table 15, December 1
st
 is the most dangerous day of 
B3_Zone1 as the same as the results of the initial analysis. ‘Falls to lower level’ (E43) 
and ‘Building materials—solid elements’ (S41) were identified the most critical hazard 
type and source of injuries indicating 19.3% and 11.1%, respectively. Compared to the 
results of initial safety analysis in the same work zone, the top three hazard types are the 
same with slightly different probabilities, but the top three sources of injuries are quite 
different. This result is similar to the comparison between the results of two versions 
work period analysis. With updated work zone safety information, the final safety 4D 
simulation for the parking garage was generated and Figure 26 shows two screen shots of 
Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E1 4404 E43 3011.8 19.3% S41 1721.22 11.1%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N4 4404 E62 2410.12 15.5% S84 1422.55 9.1%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N3 4404 E71 2107.51 13.5% S66 1339.83 8.6%
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG1) 2362
48.3% 28.8%







the final safety 4D simulation on the same dates used in Figure 23. Additional screen 
shots are shown in Appendix I. 
 
  
Figure 26: Examples of final safety 4D simulation on the parking garage 
During the review of the final safety analysis for the parking garage, all 
participants agreed that the result of the final activity safety analysis was more feasible 
and, consequently, the following final work period and zone analysis became more 
reliable. One issue related to the level of detail of the activities in the schedule was 
pointed out by the project manager. In the project schedule, the levels of detail for the 
activities are not consistent. For example, floor construction is divided into ‘Form deck’, 
‘Rebar/MEP slab’, and ‘Place concrete’ while wall construction is not divided into 
detailed activities as floor construction. This inconsistency of activity tasks resulted in 
overestimation of safety score of ‘FRP vertical wall’ activities. For example, three ‘FRP 
vertical walls’ activities are planned in B3-Zone1 on December 1
st
 (see Table 15), and 
each vertical wall activity are assumed as having six carpenters, six rodmen, seven 
laborers, and one equipment operator. However, in reality, six carpenters and two 
laborers will work on ‘FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N3’ to install forms, six rodmen will 
install rebar in ‘FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N4’, and three laborers and one equipment 
operator will place concrete on ‘FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E1’. That means safety 
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scores of three activities should be equal to safety score of one activity on December 21th 
since each vertical wall construction activity has different sub tasks. All participants in 
the meeting agreed that more reliable safety analysis can be implemented if activities in 
the schedule are detailed. 
In the third meeting, safety analysis for part of the office building was also 
reviewed. The period of this safety analysis is from August 11, 2016 to September 23, 
2016. During the period, four typical activities were analyzed and Table 16 summarizes 
the results of activity safety analysis. 
Table 16: Summary of Activity Safety Analysis for Office Building 
 
Common activity types are similar to ones analyzed in the final activity safety 
analysis for the parking garage, but the number of workers by occupations is different 
and, thus, safety score of the same activity type in the office building is different from the 
one from the parking garage. For example, in the parking garage, the safety score of 
‘Form deck’ was 4,374 with 16 carpenters and four laborers while ‘Form deck’ activity in 
Type Amount % Type Amount %
Carpenter 21 E43 1790.82 26.0% S65 743.43 10.8%
Laborer 9 E62 1182.78 17.2% S84 705.72 10.2%
E71 711.06 10.3% S74 612.84 8.9%
Total 30 Representative 53.4% Representative 29.9%
Carpenter 2 E43 398.04 19.6% S84 212.17 10.5%
Rodman 2 E62 338.88 16.7% S41 195.36 9.6%
Laborer 4 E71 234.92 11.6% S65 163.14 8.0%
Equipment Operator 1
Total 9 Representative 47.9% Representative 28.1%
Rodman 15 E71 855.81 25.1% S41 693.46 20.3%
Electrician 3 E42 515.96 15.1% S66 526.19 15.4%
Plumber 2 E62 467.1 13.7% S56 416.41 12.2%
Total 20 Representative 53.9% Representative 48.0%
Carpenter 4 E71 489.83 17.4% S32 209.38 7.4%
Laborer 3 E43 427.08 15.2% S84 197.24 7.0%
Concrete Finisher 16 E62 397.84 14.1% S65 179.38 6.4%
Equipment Operator 1
Total 24 Representative 46.7% Representative 20.8%














the office building has 21 carpenters and nine laborers resulting in the safety risk score of 
6,895. 
Figure 27 shows the work period safety analysis for the building office. 
 
 
Figure 27: Work period safety analysis for the office building 
In the work period analysis, five dates, August 22nd, 29th and September 2nd, 
12th, 16th, were identified as the most dangerous days having a total safety score of 
12,334. In the office building, ‘Form deck’, ‘Rebar/MEP slab’, ‘Place concrete’, and 
‘FRP vertical concrete column’ activities are repeated, and, thus, a fluctuation of safety 
score also repeats. Compared to the garage building, the maximum daily safety score of 
the building office is much lower than that of the garage building. That is because the 
square footage of the parking garage is much larger than the one of office building and, 
consequently, more activities are planned simultaneously. Table 17 summarizes specific 
analysis for August 22
nd
, 2016. More analyses can be found in Appendix J. 
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As analyzed in Table 17, August 22nd shows a total safety score of 12,334 and 
has three activities planned at that day. Also, ‘Falls to lower level’ (E43) and ‘Building 
materials—solid elements’ (S41) are the most possible hazard type and source of injuries 
representing 19.8% and 11.1%, respectively. 
In order to examine the concentration of safety riskiness on work zones, work 
zone safety was also analyzed for the office building based on the zoning plan shown in 
Figure 28. 
 
Figure 28: Zoning plan for office building 
 
Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Concrete Level 6 Pour 1 2030 E43 2446.91 19.8% S41 1375.21 11.1%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 6 Pour 2 3409 E62 1988.76 16.1% S66 1120.26 9.1%










Figure 29 and Table 18 show the safety score profile in Zone 1 at Level 6 
(L6_Zone1), as well as specific analysis on the most dangerous day. Work zone safety 
analysis for the rest of work zones can be found in Appendix J. 
 
 
Figure 29: Work zone safety analysis for L6_Zone1 
Table 18: Summary of Safety Analysis on August 16th in L6_Zone1 
 
 
As shown in Figure 29 and Table 18, August 16
th
 is identified as the most 
dangerous day of L6_Zone1 indicating two activities are planned simultaneously. ‘Falls 
to lower level’ (E43) and ‘Building materials—solid elements’ (S41) are identified as the 
most critical hazard type and source of injuries indicating 19.9% and 11.5%, respectively. 
Type Amount % Type Amount %
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 6 Pour 1 6895 E43 2048.87 19.9% S41 1179.85 11.5%
Form Deck Level 6 Pour 1 3409 E62 1649.88 16.0% S66 970.88 9.4%
E71 1566.87 15.2% S65 797.45 7.7%
51.1% 28.6%







In the office building safety analysis, each work zone has a similar trend of safety score 
profile because the sizes of zones are similar and five activities are repeated. 
Based on work zone safety information, a safety 4D simulation was generated and 
Figure 30 shows two screen shots of the safety 4D simulation for the office building. 
Additional images can be found in Appendix J. 
 
  
Figure 30: Examples of safety 4D simulation on the office building 
As can be seen Figure 30, work zone riskiness were classified and visualized with 
three colors: green for low, blue for medium, and red for high risky work zones. The 
same criteria was used as the parking garage to determine three levels. One of main 
purposes to develop a safety 4D simulation for the office building was to visually identify 
activities planned at upper levels. However, there were no activities scheduled in a level 
immediately above where an activity was taking place. 
 
4.5 POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND CHALLENGES 
During the three rounds of meetings, several potential benefits and barriers were 
identified. Potential benefits are: 
 The step-by-step safety risk analysis process helps safety managers develop a 
safety planning systematically. According to the safety manager, the company 
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does not have any formalized framework for analyzing activity safety risk. 
Although the safety manager recognized the importance of proactive risk analysis 
to prepare risk controls in advance, they have difficulty analyzing them due to the 
lack of tools. Consequently, safety risks were only predicted on a daily- or 
weekly-based during the construction, based on experiential knowledge. 
 The proposed safety risk analysis can explain why certain activities, days, and 
zones are dangerous based on historical data and a schedule, respectively. The 
safety manager pointed out that one of the biggest challenges he encountered was 
to explain why some workers will be in danger. Due to the lack of reliable data, 
the safety manager only attempted to instruct field workers based on his intuition, 
which is not effective. Since the proposed safety planning approach can provide 
common hazard types and sources of injuries by activities, daily, and work zones, 
this study has great potential to improve current tacit-based safety management. 
 Long-term safety risk prediction is possible. The safety manager mentioned that 
current safety inspection plans are developed in the short-term, such as on a daily 
basis. As a result, they sometimes fail to prepare enough safety actions in 
advance. Using the safety profile generated from the safety schedule, the safety 
inspection plan can be developed in advance and adequate safety actions can be 
prepared. 
 Visualized outcomes such as safety 4D simulation can increase safety 
communication among project participants. According to the project manager, 
most safety communication happens verbally. If all project participants can share 
visualized safety materials related to their works, increased safety awareness and 
understandings are expected. 
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Even though potential benefits are promising, there are several challenges to be 
solved. 
 More automatic process is necessary. Even though daily safety and work zone 
safety scores can be updated dynamically as a schedule is updated, activities’ 
safety scores should be added to the schedule manually which might be time-
consuming and error-prone. Also, when a work zone plan changes, locations of all 
activities should be reviewed and reallocated if necessary. One of main reasons of 
not analyzing the entire project is that the zoning plan used in this study is 
supposed to be updated shortly. 
 The proposed safety planning process was aimed to help safety managers analyze 
safety risk in a systematic manner by integrating a project schedule and 3D 
model. However, safety managers are not knowledgeable in generating safety 
schedules and 4D simulations, which require knowledge on related software. 
Therefore, it is necessary to train safety managers to properly obtain such skills to 
enable seamless integration of schedules and safety plans. 
In general, the project team that participated in this research expected more 
potential benefits of the proposed safety planning process and promised willingly to help 
further this study. Once the work zone plan is updated, the safety risk of the entire project 
will be analyzed. In addition, the visualized outcomes will be used for safety 
meetings/training in the project. 
4.5 CONCLUSIONS 
Traditional safety planning approach mostly relies on tacit knowledge as well as 
regulations, company safety policies, and 2D drawings. As a result, site-specific temporal 
(e.g. when and who will be exposed to potential hazards) and spatial (e.g. location of 
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dangerous zones) information are currently not specifically addressed in a formalized 
manner. To address this gap, this study proposed a formalized framework for the 
construction safety planning process in a 4-dimensional (4D) environment to address site-
specific temporal and spatial safety information. The proposed framework analyzed work 
period and work zone safety by integrating an activity safety data with a project schedule 
and a 3D model. The proposed safety planning process was tested with a real-world 
project and modified based on valuable feedback from practitioners.  
The proposed safety planning approach with temporal and spatial inputs can 
provide safety personnel with a site-specific proactive safety planning tool and the 
proposed macro-level site-specific safety planning framework can be integrated with 
micro-level safety practices such short-term based logistic plan or inspection plan to 
optimize jobsite safety management. In addition, visual safety materials can also aid in 
worker safety training and, consequently, positively impact safety communications and 
awareness of site-specific hazards. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions and Future Research 
This research aimed at formalizing the construction safety planning process in a 
4-dimensional (4D) environment to address site-specific temporal and spatial safety 
information. The vision of this research is that the proposed framework can be used to 
provide guidance for developing site-specific safety plans in a systematic manner by 
integrating historical accident data, project schedule and 3D model. This chapter 
summarizes the major conclusions and contributions of this research, as well as suggested 
directions for future research. 
5.1 CONCLUSIONS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
Four key values for successful construction projects are cost, time, quality, and 
safety. In order to pursue these core values with satisfactory outcomes, a project team 
generates long-term prediction models and keeps tracking outcomes to meet the goal. 
Cost estimates, schedule, and drawings with specifications are long-term prediction 
models to optimize project budget, time, and quality, respectively. These prediction 
models are developed systematically. There are several reliable nation-wide references to 
aid in developing thorough plans such as RS Means for cost estimating, and a number of 
off-the-shelf software and tools that can help improve project performance. In addition, 
the first three core values (cost, time, and quality) are closely integrated to optimize the 
prediction model and obtain desired outcomes often with the aid of advanced information 
technologies. However, construction safety planning lacks reliable tools for developing a 
long-term prediction model in a systematic manner. Consequently, current construction 
safety management focuses more on short-term prediction models for specific activities, 
such as safety plans for tower crane erection and inspections during construction. In 
addition, due to the absence or quality of a long-term prediction model for safety, safety 
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plans are often segregated from other core values’ prediction models such as a project 
schedule. To overcome these challenges, this research presented a formalized framework 
for construction safety planning process to guide in developing long-term prediction 
models for safety by proposing a safety reference and a systematic process to integrate 
safety plans with other prediction models such as a project schedule and 3D model. 
As the first step, this research proposed a safety risk generation and control model 
to describe the phenomenon of dynamic safety risk with construction domain knowledge. 
In this model, I explained the pattern of safety risk generation and mitigation with 
predictable project contexts such as occupation types, physical activity contexts, and 
temporal and spatial contexts. The model assumes that every worker has inherent risk. 
When an activity is assigned to a worker, his/her risk is specified based on a number of 
activity risk and temporal/spatial risk factors. These specified activity risks may be 
mitigated by safety management control, and uncontrolled risk results in undesired 
events. The expected contribution of the proposed risk generation and control model is to 
provide a theoretical background to aid in practical risk assessment methods by 
understanding the process of safety risk generation and mitigation. 
Based on the model developed in Chapter 2, this research assesses safety risk of 
different construction trades in a quantitative manner. By integrating multiple national 
injury databases, safety risks of 17 construction occupations were quantitatively analyzed 
to explain common risk types, sources of injury, and risk scenarios associated with each 
occupation type. The findings of this assessment revealed that different occupations were 
exposed to different types of hazards and common sources of injuries are diverse by 
trades. The safety risk analysis presented in this research is expected to help project 
participants including safety managers understand the dynamic nature of safety risk. In 
addition, the results of the analysis can be used as a safety risk reference in developing 
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site-specific safety risk analysis. Lastly, the proposed data structure can provide a 
direction of future data collection related to injuries as well as near misses. 
This research proposes a formalized framework for a long-term risk prediction 
model for construction safety planning. If safety risks are predictable, they may be 
prevented. Therefore, knowing the dynamic value of safety risk can potentially aid safety 
managers as well as project managers in identifying the high-risk occupations or 
activities in advance and would enable them to prepare and allocate limited safety 
resources in a more efficient manner. Current safety planning approaches mostly rely on 
tacit knowledge. As a result, site-specific temporal (e.g. when and who will be exposed to 
potential hazards) and spatial (e.g. location of dangerous zones) information are currently 
not specifically addressed in a formalized manner. To address this gap, this study 
proposed a formalized framework for the systematic construction safety planning process 
in a 4-dimensional (4D) environment to address site-specific temporal and spatial safety 
information. The proposed framework analyzed work period and work zone safety 
riskiness by integrating an activity safety data with a project schedule and a 3D model. 
The proposed safety planning process was tested in a real-world project and modified 
based on valuable feedback from practitioners. The proposed safety planning approach 
with temporal and spatial inputs can provide safety personnel with a site-specific 
proactive safety planning tool. The proposed macro-level site-specific safety planning 
framework can be integrated with micro-level safety practices such short-term based 
logistic plan or inspection plan to optimize jobsite safety management. In addition, visual 
safety materials can also aid in worker safety training and, consequently, positively 
impact safety communications and awareness of site-specific hazards. 
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5.2 FUTURE RESEARCH 
Construction safety management is a promising research area, especially when 
integrated with advanced information and communication technologies (ITC). Directions 
for future research in this area are listed as follows: 
 (1) Integration with micro level safety planning and controls 
Even though all safety practices are important and interrelated, this research 
focused on developing a long-term safety risk prediction model, given that subsequent 
safety practices can be significantly impacted by macro level plans. If micro level safety 
plans, such as logistics or inspection plans developed during construction are integrated, 
the capability of the proposed safety planning process will be further enriched. In 
addition, the proposed safety framework identifies risky activities, risky work periods, 
and risky work zones to aid safety personnel in preparing risk controls in advance in a 
more effective manner. If specific safety controls are integrated with the proposed 
framework and generated safety reports in an automatic way, the entire safety planning 
process will be enhanced. 
(2) Development of safety risk reference by project types 
The proposed safety risk reference was developed based on the entire construction 
injury data regardless of specific project types. However, common injury types and 
sources of injuries might be different by project types as well as occupation types. 
Therefore, analyzing safety risk by project types can provide a more reliable reference to 
aid safety managers in developing more practical prediction models.   
(3) Automation in safety planning process 
As identified challenges of the proposed safety planning approach in Chapter 4.5, 
automated processes are necessary for the successful implementation of this research. 
Even though daily safety risk and work zone risks can be updated dynamically as 
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schedules are updated, safety risk scores should be added to the schedule manually which 
might be time-consuming and error-prone. Also, when a work zone plan changes, 
locations of all activities should be reviewed and reallocated if necessary. Therefore, 





Appendix A - Application of Risk Generation and Control Model to the NIOSH FACE Program 
Reports 




On April 19, 2012, a 37-year-old Hispanic male laborer fell approximately 13.5 feet from a residential roof to a 
concrete driveway; he died immediately from his injuries. The laborer was working with a crew of eight 
Hispanic workers for a construction subcontractor replacing shingles on a roof accessed by a ladder. At the time 
of the incident, five workers were on the roof, including the laborer who was out of sight of his coworkers 
working on the garage side of the home. When the incident occurred, the co-workers heard the laborer hit the 
ground, rushed to his aid, and called 911. Emergency Medical Services were dispatched to the incident and the 














On July 18, 2006, a 21-year-old male road construction worker (the victim) was fatally injured when a dump 
truck partially loaded with asphalt backed over him. The victim was a member of a road construction crew 
working at night on a state highway paving project. The dump truck driver was backing through the work zone, 
with the truck's back up alarm sounding, toward the next section of roadway to be paved when the truck struck 
the victim. The paver and paving crew had already re-positioned to the next section of roadway to be paved. 
The dump truck driver was watching the driver's side mirror as he was backing to align the truck with the re-
positioned paver. As he was backing he did not see anyone behind the truck. He then saw something appear out 
from under the front of the truck, at which time he stopped the truck. Evidence suggests the victim had his back 
to the dump truck. The victim had not been assigned tasks within the workzone, but may have been shoveling 















On June 29, 2004, a 34-year-old Hispanic flagger (the victim) died after being run over by a partially-filled 
dump truck. The victim was a member of a three-man crew filling drop-off areas along the shoulders of a 
secondary state road with a dirt/gravel mixture of unclassified stone, also known as UCL. The victim was 
flagging from a position on the passenger side of the ten-wheel dump truck, on the shoulder of the opposite side 
of the road. As the amount of UCL became insufficient to level the road shoulder, the driver-side worker 
motioned for the truck driver to stop the truck and raise the bed to allow more UCL to flow to the rear of the 
truck. When sufficient material to fill the low spots again began to flow, the worker motioned for the driver to 
pull forward. As the truck moved forward, the rear of the truck swayed and the driver-side worker again 
motioned the driver to stop. He then walked around the rear of the truck to the passenger side and discovered 
the victim underneath the two sets of rear tandem wheels. He called to the driver, who ran around the front of 
the truck to the passenger side and immediately called 911 from a cell phone. Emergency Medical Service 
(EMS) and fire personnel responded and used a jack to raise the rear axle of the truck and extricate the victim. 













On July 27, 2004, a 46-year-old chain saw operator (victim) was cutting root balls from trees pushed over 
during site clearing, when he sustained fatal crushing injuries after being struck by the bucket of a track-
mounted hydraulic excavator. The excavator operator was using the bucket on the excavator to push over trees, 
straighten downed trees for stumping, and move damaged trees to a large burn pile. When he realized he had 
not seen the victim for approximately 15 minutes, he moved the excavator to get a better view of the area and 
saw the victim on the ground. He jumped out of the excavator and ran to the victim. Unable to get a response 
when he called to the victim, he ran to his employer who called 911 on his cell phone. The employer drove to 
the main road to help emergency medical service personnel (EMS) locate the incident site. Police officers 
responded within minutes and the excavator operator accompanied them to the incident site. The victim was 














On June 24, 2002, a 21-year-old Hispanic dump-truck driver (the victim) died after being caught between the 
frame and dump body of an off-road dump truck while performing routine lubrication. The victim was working 
for an excavation contractor at a landfill expansion site on the day of the incident. The victim's foreman drove 
by the area where the company service truck was set up and stopped to investigate when he heard the air 
compressor running but not the usual clicking sounds made when workers are greasing their trucks. He found 
the victim caught between the frame and dump body of the truck. The foreman called out for help and then 
called 911 from his cell phone. An excavator operator working nearby responded to the foreman’s call for help 
and climbed into the cab of the truck and raised the bed. Emergency medical services (EMS) and law 
enforcement personnel responded within 10 minutes. EMS personnel transported the victim by ambulance to a 















On April 16, 2001, a 17-year-old male part-time road construction laborer (the victim) died when he was run 
over by the rear wheels of a water truck. When the victim arrived at the work site, his employer asked him to 
ride with him in the cab of the water truck. After riding approximately 10 minutes, the employer asked him to 
get out and go to the rear of the truck to check the fluid gauge on the tank. The truck continued moving forward 
at 3 to 5 miles per hour. A coworker, who was driving a tamping roller behind the water truck, saw the victim 
get off the back of the moving truck after checking the fluid gauge and walk around the truck toward the cab on 
the passenger side. He then saw the victim stop just before the cab, where he stooped over, leaned under the 
truck and was run over. The employer last saw the victim in his driver's side mirror when the victim poked his 
head around the tank from his position on the ladder attached to the rear of the truck. He yelled to the victim to 
get down and move to the driver's side to get ready to close an external control under the truck on the driver's 
side. When the employer stopped the truck approximately 30 to 45 seconds after last seeing the victim, he 
looked back and saw the coworker waving and the victim lying on the road. The coworker called 911 from his 














On January 17, 2001, a 15-year-old male laborer (the victim) died from injuries he sustained when he fell 
through a skylight to the lower ground level approximately 23 feet, 9 inches below. The company's president 
allowed the company's handyman to find someone to help him repair leaks in a flat roof over the company's 
three-sided warehouse. The handyman enlisted the help of his 15-year-old neighbor and brought him to the 
worksite. Neither the handyman nor laborer had received training in fall protection methods and no means of 
fall protection had been provided by the employer. They worked on the roof for approximately 6 hours, 
patching cracks with tar and gravel, and were nearly done with repairs, when the victim fell through an 
unguarded skylight. The handyman did not see the victim fall. Immediately following the incident, a worker 
inside the warehouse reported the incident to office personnel who immediately called 911. Personnel from the 













A 48-year-old male truck driver (the victim) died after the off-highway truck he was operating rolled 49 feet 
over an embankment and came to rest on its top in 4 feet of water. The victim was hauling dirt that was being 
cut from a bank to clear ground for a 3-mile stretch of a new freeway project. As the victim was traveling up a 
haulage road, a road grader that was scraping mud from the road was traveling toward him from the opposite 
direction. The victim steered the truck to the right to allow the grader to pass. As he did, a portion of the built-
up haulage road gave way under the truck's right-side tires, causing the truck to overturn. The truck rolled over 
twice while traveling 49 feet down the embankment, and came to rest on its top in 4 feet of water. The grader 
operator immediately ran to the truck and pulled the victim clear. With the help of two flaggers, they placed the 
victim on the bottom of the truck cab. The two flaggers initiated cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) on the 
victim while the emergency medical service (EMS) was called from a company truck. The EMS arrived at the 









Appendix B – 1
st
 Level Risk Types by Occupations 
 
 
Days Away Injury Fatality 
47-2000 Construction Trades Workers 
  
N: 62,760 N: 575 
47-2020 Brickmasons, Blockmasons, and Stonemasons 
  
N: 910 N: 8 
47-2030 Carpenters 
  




Days Away Injury Fatality 
47-2040 Carpet, Floor, and Tile Installers and Finishers 
 
N/A 
N: 770 N: 0 
47-2050 Cement Masons, Concrete Finishers, and Terrazzo Workers 
  
N: 900 N: 5 
47-2060 Construction Laborers 
  
N: 19,330 N: 211 
47-2070 Construction Equipment Operators 
  
N: 2,170 N: 25 
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Days Away Injury Fatality 
47-2080 Drywall Installers, Ceiling Tile Installers, and Tapers 
  
N: 1,170 N: 11 
47-2110 Electricians 
  




N: 560 N: 0 
47-2130 Insulation Workers 
  
N: 500 N: 3 
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Days Away Injury Fatality 
47-2140 Painters and Paperhangers 
  
N: 4,190 N: 42 
47-2150 Pipelayers, Plumbers, Pipefitters, and Steamfitters 
  
N: 8,310 N: 38 
47-2160 Plasterers and Stucco Masons 
 
N/A 
N: 100 N: 0 
47-2170 Reinforcing Iron and Rebar Workers 
 
N/A 
N: 480 N: 0 
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Days Away Injury Fatality 
47-2180 Roofers 
  
N: 1,710 N: 72 
47-2210 Sheet Metal Workers 
  
N: 1,830 N: 7 
47-2220 Structural Iron and Steel Workers 
  




Appendix C – 2
nd
 Level Risk Types by Occupations 
 
47-2000 Construction Trades Workers 
 







47-2040 Carpet, Floor, and Tile Installers and Finishers 
 
47-2050 Cement Masons, Concrete Finishers, and Terrazzo Workers 
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47-2060 Construction Laborers 
 
47-2070 Construction Equipment Operators 
 







47-2130 Insulation Workers 
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47-2140 Painters and Paperhangers 
 
47-2150 Pipelayers, Plumbers, Pipefitters, and Steamfitters 
 
47-2160 Plasterers and Stucco Masons 
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47-2210 Sheet Metal Workers 
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Appendix D – 1
st
 Level Sources of Injury by Occupations 
 
Days Away Injury Fatality 
47-2000 Construction Trades Workers 
  
N: 62,760 N: 575 
47-2020 Brickmasons, Blockmasons, and Stonemasons 
  
N: 910 N: 8 
47-2030 Carpenters 
  




Days Away Injury Fatality 
47-2040 Carpet, Floor, and Tile Installers and Finishers 
 
N/A 
N: 770 N: 0 
47-2050 Cement Masons, Concrete Finishers, and Terrazzo Workers 
  
N: 900 N: 5 
47-2060 Construction Laborers 
  
N: 19,330 N: 211 
47-2070 Construction Equipment Operators 
  
N: 2,170 N: 25 
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Days Away Injury Fatality 
47-2080 Drywall Installers, Ceiling Tile Installers, and Tapers 
  
N: 1,170 N: 11 
47-2110 Electricians 
  




N: 560 N: 0 
47-2130 Insulation Workers 
  
N: 500 N: 3 
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Days Away Injury Fatality 
47-2140 Painters and Paperhangers 
  
N: 4,190 N: 42 
47-2150 Pipelayers, Plumbers, Pipefitters, and Steamfitters 
  
N: 8,310 N: 38 
47-2160 Plasterers and Stucco Masons 
 
N/A 
N: 100 N: 0 
47-2170 Reinforcing Iron and Rebar Workers 
 
N/A 
N: 480 N: 0 
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Days Away Injury Fatality 
47-2180 Roofers 
  
N: 1,710 N: 72 
47-2210 Sheet Metal Workers 
  
N: 1,830 N: 7 
47-2220 Structural Iron and Steel Workers 
  




Appendix E – 2
nd
 Level Sources of Injury by Occupations 
 
47-2000 Construction Trades Workers 
 







47-2040 Carpet, Floor, and Tile Installers and Finishers 
 
47-2050 Cement Masons, Concrete Finishers, and Terrazzo Workers 
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47-2060 Construction Laborers 
 
47-2070 Construction Equipment Operators 
 







47-2130 Insulation Workers 
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47-2140 Painters and Paperhangers 
 
47-2150 Pipelayers, Plumbers, Pipefitters, and Steamfitters 
 
47-2160 Plasterers and Stucco Masons 
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47-2210 Sheet Metal Workers 
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47-2220 Structural Iron and Steel Workers 
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Appendix F – Risk Quantification Model 
F.1 CONSTRUCTION TRADES WORKERS (47-2000) 
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Appendix G – Initial Safety Analysis of Project B (Parking Garage) 











Type Amount % Type Amount % Type Amount % Type Amount % Type Amount % Type Amount %
Carpenter 1 86.75 109.72 E43 48.44 55.8% E62 25.91 23.6% E43 57.42 29.2% S74 18.03 20.8% S66 15.48 14.1% S65 22.81 11.6%
E26 11.27 13.0% E71 24.77 22.6% E62 30.42 15.5% S63 14.65 16.9% S41 14.35 13.1% S74 21.13 10.8%
E51 5.63 6.5% E42 14.35 13.1% E71 24.77 12.6% S84 14.65 16.9% S65 10.42 9.5% S63 16.71 8.5%
Total 1 86.75 109.72 Representative 75.3% 59.3% 57.3% Representative 54.6% 36.7% 30.9%
Laborer 1 167.29 140.41 E43 49.16 29.4% E62 43 30.6% E43 65 21.1% S84 38.06 22.8% S41 20.56 14.6% S84 44.23 14.4%
E24 22.2 13.3% E71 21.21 15.1% E62 60.44 19.6% S65 23.79 14.2% S56 13.66 9.7% S65 29.38 9.5%
E62 17.44 10.4% E43 15.84 11.3% E24 23.58 7.7% S74 12.69 7.6% S66 13.29 9.5% S41 20.56 6.7%
Total 1 167.29 140.41 Representative 53.1% 57.0% 48.4% Representative 44.6% 33.8% 30.6%
Carpenter 1 86.75 109.72 E43 48.44 55.8% E62 25.91 23.6% E43 57.42 29.2% S74 18.03 20.8% S66 15.48 14.1% S65 22.81 11.6%
E26 11.27 13.0% E71 24.77 22.6% E62 30.42 15.5% S63 14.65 16.9% S41 14.35 13.1% S74 21.13 10.8%
E51 5.63 6.5% E42 14.35 13.1% E71 24.77 12.6% S84 14.65 16.9% S65 10.42 9.5% S63 16.71 8.5%
Total 1 86.75 109.72 Representative 75.3% 59.3% 57.3% Representative 54.6% 36.7% 30.9%
Laborer 1 167.29 167.29 E43 49.16 29.4% E62 43 30.6% E43 65 21.1% S84 38.06 22.8% S41 20.56 14.6% S84 44.23 14.4%
E24 22.2 13.3% E71 21.21 15.1% E62 60.44 19.6% S65 23.79 14.2% S56 13.66 9.7% S65 29.38 9.5%
E62 17.44 10.4% E43 15.84 11.3% E24 23.58 7.7% S74 12.69 7.6% S66 13.29 9.5% S41 20.56 6.7%
Total 1 167.29 167.29 Representative 53.1% 57.0% 48.4% Representative 44.6% 33.8% 30.6%
Carpenter 1 86.75 109.72 E43 48.44 55.8% E62 25.91 23.6% E43 57.42 29.2% S74 18.03 20.8% S66 15.48 14.1% S65 22.81 11.6%
E26 11.27 13.0% E71 24.77 22.6% E62 30.42 15.5% S63 14.65 16.9% S41 14.35 13.1% S74 21.13 10.8%
E51 5.63 6.5% E42 14.35 13.1% E71 24.77 12.6% S84 14.65 16.9% S65 10.42 9.5% S63 16.71 8.5%
Total 1 86.75 109.72 Representative 75.3% 59.3% 57.3% Representative 54.6% 36.7% 30.9%
Rodman 1 0 166.46 E71 48.55 29.2% E71 48.55 29.2% S41 41.61 25.0% S41 41.61 25.0%
E42 31.21 18.7% E42 31.21 18.7% S66 31.21 18.7% S66 31.21 18.7%
E73 13.87 8.3% E73 13.87 8.3% S56 24.28 14.6% S56 24.28 14.6%
Total 1 0 166.46 Representative 0.0% 56.2% 56.2% Representative 0.0% 58.3% 58.3%







Common Hazard Types Common Sources of Injuires














G.3 INITIAL WORK PERIOD ANALYSIS 
Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W7 196 E43 362.5 24.9% S65 143.43 9.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W6 196 E62 222.94 15.3% S41 133.92 9.2%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S1 196 E71 193.61 13.3% S74 124.44 8.6%
SOG Pour 2 308
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG3) 196
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level B2 Pour1 166
Form Deck Level B2 Pour 1 196 Representative 53.6% Representative 27.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W7 196.47 E43 305.08 24.2% S65 120.62 9.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S2 196.47 E62 192.52 15.3% S41 119.57 9.5%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S3 196.47 E71 168.84 13.4% S66 106.42 8.4%
SOG Pour 3 307.7
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG4) 196.47
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level B2 Pour1 166.46 Representative 52.9% Representative 27.5%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S2 196.47 E43 302.26 25.1% S84 132.41 11.0%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S4 196.47 E62 212.14 17.6% S65 127.19 10.6%
SOG Pour 3 307.7 E71 116.73 9.7% S74 100.97 8.4%
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG4) 196.47
Place Concrete Level B2 Pour 1 307.7 Representative 52.4% Representative 29.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S2 196.47 E43 294.68 24.5% S65 120.62 10.0%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S4 196.47 E62 182.12 15.1% S74 103.31 8.6%
SOG Pour 3 307.7 E71 120.29 10.0% S84 102.83 8.5%
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG4) 196.47
FRP Columns Level B2 Pour 1 196.47 Representative 49.6% Representative 27.1%
Activities









G.4 INITIAL WORK ZONE SAFETY ANALYSIS 
G.4.1 Basement 3_Zone 1 



















Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E1 196 E43 229.68 29.3% S65 91.24 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N4 196 E62 121.68 15.5% S74 84.52 10.8%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N3 196 E71 99.08 12.6% S63 66.84 8.5%
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG1) 196
57.5% 30.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E1 196 E43 172.26 29.3% S65 68.43 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N4 196 E62 91.26 15.5% S74 63.39 10.8%











G.4.2 Basement 3_Zone 2 
 


















Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W1 196 E43 172.26 22.0% S65 68.43 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N1 196 E62 91.26 11.6% S74 63.39 10.8%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W2 196 E71 74.31 9.5% S63 50.13 8.5%
43.1% 30.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W1 196 E43 172.26 29.3% S65 68.43 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W2 196 E62 91.26 15.5% S74 63.39 10.8%










G.4.3 Basement 3_Zone 3 
 


















Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W4 196 E43 114.84 29.3% S65 45.62 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W3 196 E62 60.84 15.5% S74 42.26 10.8%
E71 49.54 12.6% S63 33.42 8.5%
57.5% 30.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W4 196 E43 114.84 29.3% S65 45.62 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W3 196 E62 60.84 15.5% S74 42.26 10.8%








Hazard Types Sources of Injuries
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G.4.4 Basement 3_Zone 4 
 


















Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W5 196 E43 57.42 29.3% S65 22.81 11.6%
E62 30.42 15.5% S74 21.13 10.8%
E71 24.77 12.6% S63 16.71 8.5%
57.5% 30.9%
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG4) 196 E43 57.42 29.3% S65 22.81 11.6%
E62 30.42 15.5% S74 21.13 10.8%











G.4.5 Basement 3_Zone 5 
 


















Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W7 196 E43 172.26 29.3% S65 68.43 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W6 196 E62 91.26 15.5% S74 63.39 10.8%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S1 196 E71 74.31 12.6% S63 50.13 8.5%
57.5% 30.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W7 196 E43 172.26 29.3% S65 68.43 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S2 196 E62 91.26 15.5% S74 63.39 10.8%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S3 196 E71 74.31 12.6% S63 50.13 8.5%
57.5% 30.9%
11/23/2015 588







G.4.6 Basement 3_Zone 6 
 



















Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E4 196 E43 114.84 29.3% S65 45.62 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E3 196 E62 60.84 15.5% S74 42.26 10.8%
E71 49.54 12.6% S63 33.42 8.5%
57.5% 30.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E2 196 E43 172.26 29.3% S65 68.43 11.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E4 196 E62 91.26 15.5% S74 63.39 10.8%










G.4.7 Basement 2_Zone 1 
 


















Type Amount % Type Amount %
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level B2 Pour1 166 E71 73.32 20.3% S41 55.96 15.5%
Form Deck Level B2 Pour 1 196 E43 67.82 18.7% S66 46.69 12.9%
E42 45.56 12.6% S56 31.81 8.8%
51.6% 37.1%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level B2 Pour1 166 E71 73.32 20.3% S41 55.96 15.5%
Form Deck Level B2 Pour 1 196 E43 67.82 18.7% S66 46.69 12.9%
E42 45.56 12.6% S56 31.81 8.8%
51.6% 37.1%
12/22/2015 362































Appendix I – Final Safety Analysis of Project B (Parking Garage) 




















% Type Amount % Type Amount % Type Amount % Type Amount %
Carpenter 6 86.75 109.72 520.5 658.32 E43 634.76 36.6% E71 591.83 22.1% E43 864.32 19.6% S84 359.22 20.7% S41 480.88 18.0% S41 480.88 10.9%
Rodman 6 0 166.46 0 998.76 E24 182.22 10.5% E62 522.9 19.6% E62 683.48 15.5% S65 240.87 13.9% S66 376.01 14.1% S84 403.46 9.2%
Laborer 7 167.29 140.41 1171.03 982.87 E26 167.51 9.7% E42 370.73 13.9% E71 591.83 13.4% S74 197.01 11.4% S56 288.43 10.8% S66 376.01 8.5%
Equipment Operator 1 40.85 32.49 40.85 32.49
Total 20 1732.38 2672.44 Representative 56.8% 55.6% Representative 48.6% Representative 46.0% 42.9% Representative 28.6%
Carpenter 4 86.75 109.72 347 438.88 E43 488.72 28.7% E71 767.28 27.5% E71 767.28 17.1% S84 296.76 17.4% S41 472.42 16.9% S41 472.42 10.5%
Rodman 6 0 166.46 0 998.76 E24 213.92 12.6% E62 491.64 17.6% E43 686.88 15.3% S65 192.3 11.3% S56 335.94 12.0% S56 335.94 7.5%
Laborer 6 167.29 140.41 1003.74 842.46 E62 145.56 8.5% E42 331.88 11.9% E62 637.2 14.2% S32 173 10.2% S66 334.6 12.0% S84 335.88 7.5%
Concrete Finisher 12 22.54 37.16 270.48 445.92
Equipment Operator 2 40.85 32.49 81.7 64.98
Total 30 1702.92 2791 Representative 49.8% 57.0% Representative 46.5% Representative 38.9% 41.0% Representative 25.5%
Carpenter 2 86.75 109.72 173.5 219.44 E43 293.52 33.2% E71 332.02 22.4% E43 418.84 17.7% S84 186.44 21.1% S41 278.58 18.8% S41 278.58 11.8%
Rodman 4 0 166.46 0 665.84 E26 102.1 11.6% E62 269.46 18.2% E62 359.68 15.2% S65 119.94 13.6% S66 211.8 14.3% S84 212.17 9.0%
Laborer 4 167.29 140.41 669.16 561.64 E62 90.22 10.2% E42 210.59 14.2% E71 332.02 14.1% S74 86.82 9.8% S56 168.77 11.4% S66 211.8 9.0%
Equipment Operator 1 40.85 32.49 40.85 32.49
Total 11 883.51 1479.41 Representative 55.0% 54.9% Representative 47.0% Representative 44.5% 44.6% Representative 29.7%
Carpenter 3 86.75 109.72 260.25 329.16 E43 931.88 30.4% E62 789.61 24.8% E43 1214.66 19.4% S84 657.81 21.4% S41 386.41 12.1% S84 757.58 12.1%
Laborer 16 167.29 140.41 2676.64 2676.64 E24 389.92 12.7% E71 498.03 15.6% E62 1093.62 17.5% S65 417.81 13.6% S56 267.86 8.4% S65 538.51 8.6%
Concrete Finisher 4 22.54 37.16 90.16 148.64 E62 304.01 9.9% E43 282.78 8.9% E71 498.03 8.0% S74 257.13 8.4% S66 261.92 8.2% S41 386.41 6.2%
Equipment Operator 1 40.85 32.49 40.85 32.49
Total 24 3067.9 3186.93 Representative 53.0% 49.3% Representative 44.9% Representative 43.4% 28.7% Representative 26.9%
Carpenter 16 86.75 109.72 1388 1755.52 E43 971.68 47.2% E71 864.87 37.3% E43 1174.62 26.9% S84 386.64 18.8% S41 311.84 13.5% S65 482.48 11.0%
Laborer 4 167.29 140.41 669.16 561.64 E26 237.4 11.5% E42 555.57 24.0% E71 864.87 19.8% S74 339.24 16.5% S66 300.84 13.0% S74 413.24 9.4%
2057.16 2317.16 E24 142.88 6.9% E62 260.29 11.2% E42 555.57 12.7% S65 293.4 14.3% S65 189.08 8.2% S84 411.32 9.4%
Total 20 Representative 65.7% 72.5% Representative 59.3% Representative 49.5% 34.6% Representative 29.9%
Rodman 15 0 166.46 0 2496.9 E51 85.93 22.2% E71 855.81 28.3% E71 855.81 25.1% S84 78.41 20.3% S41 693.46 22.9% S41 693.46 20.3%
Electrician 3 86.75 90.66 260.25 271.98 E26 74.81 19.3% E42 515.96 17.1% E42 515.96 15.1% S44 61.47 15.9% S66 526.19 17.4% S66 526.19 15.4%
Plumber 2 63.33 126.89 126.66 253.78 E43 48.92 12.6% E62 447.1 14.8% E62 467.1 13.7% S74 20.86 5.4% S56 416.41 13.8% S56 416.41 12.2%
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I.3 FINAL WORK PERIOD ANALYSIS 
Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W1 4404 E43 3698.68 18.4% S41 2193.64 10.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W3 4404 E62 3047.32 15.2% S84 1758.43 8.8%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W2 4404 E71 2874.79 14.3% S66 1674.43 8.3%
SOG Pour 1 4493
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG2) 2362 47.9% 28.0%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W6 4404 E43 4013.08 20.0% S41 2024.6 10.1%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W5 4404 E62 3092.32 15.4% S84 1766.29 8.8%
SOG Pour 2 4493 E71 2764.12 13.8% S66 1599.26 8.0%
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG3) 2362
Form Deck Level B2 Pour 1 4374 49.3% 26.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W7 4404 E43 5135.45 18.4% S41 3198.94 11.5%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W6 4404 E62 4242.9 15.2% S66 2501.46 9.0%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S1 4404 E71 4211.76 15.1% S84 2261.12 8.1%
SOG Pour 2 4493
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG3) 2362
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level B2 Pour1 3409
Form Deck Level B2 Pour 1 4374 48.8% 28.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W7 4404 E43 3956.73 16.9% S41 2887.1 12.3%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S2 4404 E71 3730.6 15.9% S66 2200.62 9.4%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S3 4404 E62 3514.42 15.0% S84 1849.8 7.9%
SOG Pour 3 4493
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG4) 2362
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level B2 Pour1 3409 47.7% 29.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S2 4404 E43 3984.02 18.2% S41 2078.61 9.5%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S4 4404 E62 3397.02 15.5% S84 2068.32 9.4%
SOG Pour 3 4493 E71 2759.78 12.6% S65 1624.83 7.4%
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG4) 2362


















I.4 FINAL WORK ZONE ANALYSIS 
I.4.1 Basement 3_Zone 1 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E1 4404 E43 3011.8 19.3% S41 1721.22 11.1%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N4 4404 E62 2410.12 15.5% S84 1422.55 9.1%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N3 4404 E71 2107.51 13.5% S66 1339.83 8.6%
FRP Columns Level B3 (in SOG1) 2362
48.3% 28.8%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E1 4404 E43 2592.96 19.6% S41 1442.64 10.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N4 4404 E62 2050.44 15.5% S84 1210.38 9.2%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-EW1 4404 E71 1775.49 13.4% S66 1128.03 8.5%
48.6% 28.6%








I.4.2 Basement 3_Zone 2 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W1 4404 E43 2592.96 16.6% S41 1442.64 10.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-N1 4404 E62 2050.44 13.2% S84 1210.38 9.2%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W2 4404 E71 1775.49 11.4% S66 1128.03 8.5%
41.2% 28.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W1 4404 E43 2147.48 19.2% S41 1240.34 11.1%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W2 4404 E62 1726.64 15.5% S66 963.82 8.6%
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I.4.3 Basement 3_Zone 3 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W4 4404 E43 1728.64 19.6% S41 961.76 10.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W3 4404 E62 1366.96 15.5% S84 806.92 9.2%
E71 1183.66 13.4% S66 752.02 8.5%
48.6% 28.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W4 4404 E43 1728.64 19.6% S41 961.76 10.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W3 4404 E62 1366.96 15.5% S84 806.92 9.2%
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I.4.4 Basement 3_Zone 4 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W5 4404 E43 864.32 19.6% S41 480.88 10.9%
E62 683.48 15.5% S84 403.46 9.2%












I.4.5 Basement 3_Zone 5 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W7 4404 E43 2592.96 19.6% S41 1442.64 10.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W6 4404 E62 2050.44 15.5% S84 1210.38 9.2%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S1 4404 E71 1775.49 13.4% S66 1128.03 8.5%
48.6% 28.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-W7 4404 E43 2592.96 19.6% S41 1442.64 10.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S2 4404 E62 2050.44 15.5% S84 1210.38 9.2%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-S3 4404 E71 1775.49 13.4% S66 1128.03 8.5%
48.6% 28.6%
11/23/2015 13212







I.4.6 Basement 3_Zone 6 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E4 4404 E43 1728.64 19.6% S41 961.76 10.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E3 4404 E62 1366.96 15.5% S84 806.92 9.2%
E71 1183.66 13.4% S66 752.02 8.5%
48.6% 28.6%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E2 4404 E43 2592.96 19.6% S41 1442.64 10.9%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E4 4404 E62 2050.44 15.5% S84 1210.38 9.2%
FRP Vertical Walls Level B3-E3 4404 E71 1775.49 13.4% S66 1128.03 8.5%
48.6% 28.6%








I.4.7 Basement 2_Zone 1 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level B2 Pour1 3409 E43 1436.77 18.5% S41 1005.3 12.9%
Form Deck Level B2 Pour 1 4374 E62 1195.58 15.4% S66 827.03 10.6%
E71 1336.97 17.2% S56 591.53 7.6%
51.0% 31.1%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level B2 Pour1 3409 E43 1436.77 18.5% S41 1005.3 12.9%
Form Deck Level B2 Pour 1 4374 E62 1195.58 15.4% S66 827.03 10.6%
































Appendix J – Final Safety Analysis of Project B (Office Building) 





J.2 FINAL ACTIVITY ANALYSIS 
 
  
Fatality Days away Fatality Days away Type Amoun % Type Amoun % Type Amount % Type Amount % Type Amount % Type Amount %
Carpenter 21 86.75 109.72 1821.75 2304.12 E43 1459.68 43.9% E62 931.11 26.1% E43 1790.82 26.0% S84 650.19 19.5% S41 486.39 13.6% S65 743.43 10.8%
Laborer 9 167.29 140.41 1505.61 1263.69 E26 365.1 11.0% E71 711.06 19.9% E62 1182.78 17.2% S74 492.84 14.8% S66 444.69 12.5% S84 705.72 10.2%
E24 270.78 8.1% E42 422.31 11.8% E71 711.06 10.3% S65 474.3 14.3% S56 281.07 7.9% S74 612.84 8.9%
Total 30 3327.36 3567.81 Representative 63.0% 57.9% Representative 53.4% Representative 48.6% 34.0% Representative 29.9%
Carpenter 2 86.75 109.72 173.5 219.44 E43 293.52 33.2% E62 248.66 21.7% E43 398.04 19.6% S84 186.44 21.1% S41 195.36 17.0% S84 212.17 10.5%
Rodman 2 0 166.46 0 332.92 E24 102.1 11.6% E71 234.92 20.5% E62 338.88 16.7% S66 149.38 16.9% S66 149.38 13.0% S41 195.36 9.6%
Laborer 4 167.29 140.41 669.16 561.64 E62 90.22 10.2% E42 148.17 12.9% E71 234.92 11.6% S74 86.82 9.8% S56 120.21 10.5% S65 163.14 8.0%
Equipment Operator 1 40.85 32.49 40.85 32.49
Total 9 883.51 1146.49 Representative 55.0% 55.1% Representative 47.9% Representative 47.8% 40.6% Representative 28.1%
Rodman 15 0 166.46 0 2496.9 E51 85.93 22.2% E71 855.81 28.3% E71 855.81 25.1% S84 78.41 20.3% S41 693.46 22.9% S41 693.46 20.3%
Electrician 3 86.75 90.66 260.25 271.98 E26 74.81 19.3% E42 515.96 17.1% E42 515.96 15.1% S44 61.47 15.9% S66 526.19 17.4% S66 526.19 15.4%
Plumber 2 63.33 126.89 126.66 253.78 E43 48.92 12.6% E62 447.1 14.8% E62 467.1 13.7% S74 20.86 5.4% S56 416.41 13.8% S56 416.41 12.2%
Total 20 386.91 3022.66 Representative 54.2% 60.2% Representative 53.9% Representative 41.5% 54.1% Representative 48.0%
Carpenter 4 86.75 109.72 347 438.88 E43 341.24 27.3% E71 489.83 31.2% E71 489.83 17.4% S84 177.68 14.2% S41 173.08 11.0% S32 209.38 7.4%
Laborer 3 167.29 140.41 501.87 501.87 E24 158.82 12.7% E62 316.04 20.2% E43 427.08 15.2% S32 131.6 10.5% S56 172.09 11.0% S84 197.24 7.0%
Concrete Finisher 16 22.54 37.16 360.64 594.56 E26 87.89 7.0% E42 101.01 6.4% E62 397.84 14.1% S65 120.93 9.7% S71 164.08 10.5% S65 179.38 6.4%
Equipment Operator 1 40.85 32.49 40.85 32.49
Total 24 1250.36 1567.8 Representative 47.0% 57.8% Representative 46.7% Representative 34.4% 32.5% Representative 20.8%
Fatality
Common Sources of Injuires

















J.3 FINAL WORK PERIOD ANALYSIS 
  
Type Amount % Type Amount %
FRP Vertical Concrete Level 6 Pour 1 2030 E43 2446.91 19.8% S41 1375.21 11.1%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 6 Pour 2 3409 E62 1988.76 16.1% S66 1120.26 9.1%
Form Deck Level 6 Pour 2 6895 E71 1801.79 14.6% S84 1009.26 8.2%
50.6% 28.4%
FRP Vertical Concrete Level 6 Pour 2 2030 E43 2446.91 19.8% S41 1375.21 11.1%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 7 Pour 1 3409 E62 1988.76 16.1% S66 1120.26 9.1%
Form Deck Level 7 Pour 1 6895 E71 1801.79 14.6% S84 1009.26 8.2%
50.6% 28.4%
FRP Vertical Concrete Level 6 Pour 2 2030 E43 2446.91 19.8% S41 1375.21 11.1%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 7 Pour 1 3409 E62 1988.76 16.1% S66 1120.26 9.1%
Form Deck Level 7 Pour 1 6895 E71 1801.79 14.6% S84 1009.26 8.2%
50.6% 28.4%
FRP Vertical Concrete Level 7 Pour 1 2030 E43 2446.91 19.8% S41 1375.21 11.1%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 7 Pour 2 3409 E62 1988.76 16.1% S66 1120.26 9.1%
Form Deck Level 7 Pour 2 6895 E71 1801.79 14.6% S84 1009.26 8.2%
50.6% 28.4%
FRP Vertical Concrete Level 7 Pour 2 2030 E43 2446.91 19.8% S41 1375.21 11.1%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 8 Pour 1 3409 E62 1988.76 16.1% S66 1120.26 9.1%














J.4 FINAL WORK ZONE ANALYSIS 
J.4.1 Level 6_Zone 1 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
Form Deck Level 6 Pour 1 6895 E43 1790.82 26.0% S65 743.43 10.8%
E62 1182.78 17.2% S84 705.72 10.2%
E71 711.06 10.3% S74 612.84 8.9%
53.4% 29.9%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 6 Pour 1 6895 E43 2048.87 19.9% S41 1179.85 11.5%
Form Deck Level 6 Pour 1 3409 E62 1649.88 16.0% S66 970.88 9.4%
E71 1566.87 15.2% S65 797.45 7.7%
51.1% 28.6%








J.4.2 Level 6_Zone 2 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 6 Pour 2 6895 E43 2048.87 19.9% S41 1179.85 11.5%
Form Deck Level 6 Pour 2 3409 E62 1649.88 16.0% S66 970.88 9.4%
E71 1566.87 15.2% S65 797.45 7.7%
51.1% 28.6%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 6 Pour 2 6895 E43 2048.87 19.9% S41 1179.85 11.5%
Form Deck Level 6 Pour 2 3409 E62 1649.88 16.0% S66 970.88 9.4%
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J.4.3 Level 7_Zone 1 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
Form Deck Level 7 Pour 1 6895 E43 1790.82 26.0% S65 743.43 10.8%
E62 1182.78 17.2% S84 705.72 10.2%
E71 711.06 10.3% S74 612.84 8.9%
53.4% 29.9%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 7 Pour 1 6895 E43 2048.87 19.9% S41 1179.85 11.5%
Form Deck Level 7 Pour 1 3409 E62 1649.88 16.0% S66 970.88 9.4%
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J.4.4 Level 7_Zone 2 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 7 Pour 2 6895 E43 2048.87 19.9% S41 1179.85 11.5%
Form Deck Level 7 Pour 2 3409 E62 1649.88 16.0% S66 970.88 9.4%
E71 1566.87 15.2% S65 797.45 7.7%
51.1% 28.6%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 7 Pour 2 6895 E43 2048.87 19.9% S41 1179.85 11.5%
Form Deck Level 7 Pour 2 3409 E62 1649.88 16.0% S66 970.88 9.4%










J.4.5 Level 8_Zone 1 
 








Type Amount % Type Amount %
Form Deck Level 8 Pour 1 6895 E43 1790.82 26.0% S65 743.43 10.8%
E62 1182.78 17.2% S84 705.72 10.2%
E71 711.06 10.3% S74 612.84 8.9%
53.4% 29.9%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 8 Pour 1 6895 E43 2048.87 19.9% S41 1179.85 11.5%
Form Deck Level 8 Pour 1 3409 E62 1649.88 16.0% S66 970.88 9.4%
E71 1566.87 15.2% S65 797.45 7.7%
51.1% 28.6%
9/12/2016 10304







J.4.6 Level 8_Zone 2 
 












Type Amount % Type Amount %
Form Deck Level 8 Pour 2 6895 E43 2048.87 19.9% S41 1179.85 11.5%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 8 Pour 2 3409 E62 1649.88 16.0% S66 970.88 9.4%
E71 1566.87 15.2% S65 797.45 7.7%
51.1% 28.6%
Rebar/MEP Slab Rough Level 7 Pour 2 6895 E43 2048.87 19.9% S41 1179.85 11.5%
Form Deck Level 8 Pour 2 3409 E62 1649.88 16.0% S66 970.88 9.4%
E71 1566.87 15.2% S65 797.45 7.7%
51.1% 28.6%
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